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ral histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Dr. Joseph H. Engel was a Fellow of the
Institute for Operations Research and the
Management Sciences (INFORMS). In 1968
he was President of the Operations Research
Society of America (ORSA), which later
merged with the Institute of Management
Sciences (TIMS) to form INFORMS. He
won the INFORMS Military Applications
Society (MAS) J. Steinhardt Prize in 1986,
and in 1992 was awarded the INFORMS
George E. Kimball Medal. Joe was on the
MORS Board of Directors in the late 1960s.
He was an analyst in the Operations Evalua-
tion Group (OEG) and was Director at the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). Dr. Engel
died on May 29, 2011. This interview was
conducted in Fairfax, Virginia on December
21, 2004; January 25, 2005; January 29, 2005;
April 27, 2005; and May 2, 2005.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Bob Sheldon: We’re here to interview Joe
Engel. First of all, please state your name
and where you were born and raised.
Joe Engel: Joseph Henry Engel and you
can call me Joe. I was born in 1922 in the
Bronx, New York City, New York State,
the United States of America, the world.
(Laughing)
Bob Sheldon: Who are your parents and
can you tell me a little about them?
Joe Engel: My mother’s maiden name
was Jennie Gotthilf. My father’s name was
Arthur Engel.
I know that my father had an education
in the United States up through high school.
I do not know whether or not he had any
further formal education beyond that level,
although I doubt it. My mother, similarly,
received all her education through high
school in the United States and probably
in New York City.
Bob Sheldon: What did your dad do for
a living?
Joe Engel: Most of the time that I was
aware of what he did I did not know what
he did for a living. When I was very small
I didn’t pay too much attention to what
my father did for a living, but I did see
him and I remember seeing him and know-
ing about him. It wasn’t until I was around
seven or eight years old, that I first had
some exposure to work that he did. I had
great fun the first time he took me for
a drive with him as he drove a laundry
wagon with a horse in front of it. He was
the driver and laundry man who picked
up people’s laundry and delivered it. I sat
up high on the seat and watched the road
and saw my father very professionally
pulling on the reins and had the fun of
feeding sugar to the horse.
The other experience that I had with my
father’s employment occurred about a year
later. This time he was driving a laundry
truck. He had been promoted and moved
with the times into a more modern technol-
ogy. He probably got more money for it, but
it wasn’t great for me because I couldn’t
feed the horse and play with it. That’s all
that I know about my father’s employment,
because he was out of the house for a long
time.
When I was around 10 years old in 1932,
my mother informed me that she and my fa-
ther were going to divorce. I later learned
that they had been legally separated for
many years. There were never any quarrels
when my parents were together to lead me
to feel that they were having some kind of
problem that would lead to a divorce. It
came as a surprise, and from the time the di-
vorce took place I only saw my father briefly,
for a year after the divorce.
Bob Sheldon: Tell me about your early
schooling.
Joe Engel: I started kindergarten at a
lovely New York City free elementary pub-
lic school, right across the street from the
apartment in which we lived. It was not
difficult to get to school at all, even though
I was only 4 1/2 at the time. I knew how to
cross the street, on a little quiet side street.
I discovered many years later that even at
the age of 4 1/2 I had already developed a
competitive spirit and was very interested
in doing well. I was into engineering and
science, because one of the things that I ob-
viously became aware of was the impor-
tance of the time it took to do something.
I also learned how to count. So right there
in kindergarten, whether I knew it or not,
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In elementary school, I discovered that I
loved to learn and I loved to read. I recall, very
distinctly, going to the New York public library
very near my house on the first day of school, af-
ter I had finished kindergarten and moved into
the first grade. It was half a dozen blocks or so to
get to the library. I went up to the desk of the li-
brarian and she said, ‘‘What can I do for you
young man?’’ And I said, ‘‘I would like to have
a library card.’’ She said, ‘‘What grade are you in
school?’’ I said, ‘‘Today was my first day in 1A at
Public School 33.’’ She said, ‘‘Well, we are not
allowed to admit you in 1A. Come back in the
second half of the first year, namely when you
are in 1B.’’
I came back on the first day of 1B and asked
for a library card and she gave me one. From
then on I read as many books as I was allowed
to take out. They were picture books for the
most part, very little in the way of words in
them. As soon as I possibly could, which was
probably in the second grade, I was able to get
a full-fledged library card. Then I would take
out the maximum every day and usually bring
them back the next day. I was never overdue.
I just loved to read and I loved to go to school.
In addition to English and English composition,
we learned mathematics—that is to say, arith-
metic. And we learned something about the
world. We took courses in geography and his-
tory. There wasn’t a subject that I took in ele-
mentary school that I didn’t find interesting.
That was the beginning of it.
This progression continued. On the first day
of class when I entered the second grade, my
teacher, Mrs. Buckley, said, ‘‘Who would like to
be the class reporter for our school magazine?’’
The Broadcaster was a lovely magazine printed
on slick paper, with a nice cover on it. I put my
hand up immediately. She said, ‘‘Very well,
you’re the class reporter Joseph,’’ and that was
that. I continued to be the class reporter through
the sixth grade. I did a certain amount of writing
myself and I chose pieces that the other students
had written and submitted. I learned about lay-
out and deadlines—not much—but the begin-
nings. I became interested in writing and using
it for a purpose, not merely to educate, but also
to entertain and instruct whoever would be read-
ing. Also I learned how to get these from other
people besides myself.
I was entering the field of journalism and by
the time the sixth grade had come along, I had
pretty much decided that I was going to be an
English major and become a writer or journalist,
or both. All that changed in my first semester of
junior high school where I was in a rapid ad-
vance junior high, where you would go through
three years of junior high in two years. In that
first semester, I was introduced to elementary
algebra. Up until that point I had solved word
problems using strictly arithmetic. But in alge-
bra we learned about the concept of a variable
whose value is not known until you solved an
equation. We learned first-degree equations,
and then we learned second-degree equations,
and we learned how to solve them and how to
use them in various interesting applied ways.
I was absolutely entranced.
I got encouragement from two people whom
I remember very much for the help that they
gave me. I decided, right then and there, that
mathematics was going to be my other career.
The first person who got me started was my
maternal grandfather who was living with us
at the time. He didn’t speak English particu-
larly well, but he did speak some English as op-
posed to my grandmother who did not. He
spoke Hebrew and Yiddish and English. He
spoke a pretty good grade of English for some-
one who was not taught English formally in an
English-speaking country. When I’d come home
from school around three o’clock, he would say
to me, ‘‘Joseph, what did you learn in school to-
day?’’ And I would tell him. One day I came
home, and I was all excited. I said, ‘‘Today,
Grandfather, we learned how to sum a series.’’
And he said, ‘‘What does that mean? What is
a series?’’ I explained to him that there were
many different kinds of series and the first ones
we learned were arithmetic series and there
were also geometric series. I told him the arith-
metic series was a bunch of numbers, each of
which was the same amount more or less than
the previous one.
The simplest example of an arithmetic se-
ries is one plus two plus three plus four plus
five. He said, ‘‘What’s so hard about that? You
just add them up.’’ I said, ‘‘Yes, but suppose
you have to add up a hundred of them? That
takes a long time and we were taught a short
way using algebra to add up any large number
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of numbers in an arithmetic series.’’ He said,
‘‘Tell me, how do you do it?’’ I told him the for-
mula was you take the first number in the series,
you take the last number in the series, you add
them up, you multiply by the number of terms
in the series, and you then divide it by 2, and
that’s the answer. I said, ‘‘With that, I can add
up the first hundred numbers and give you the
answer very rapidly and you couldn’t do it as fast
as I do adding them up one at a time.’’ He said,
‘‘You’re right. So tell me, what’s the answer?’’ I
got out my pencil and paper and I did exactly
what I told him. I wrote down one and I wrote
down one hundred, I added them up and got
101, multiplied by the number of numbers that I
had (100) and divided by two. So the answer is
5,050 and I said, ‘‘And that’s it.’’ He looked at
me and said, ‘‘That’s right, Joseph.’’ (Laughing)
It gave me great respect for him. I loved him
already before that, but that also added a great
deal of respect because while he was quizzing
me he knew what I was talking about. He knew
it very well, enough so that long before I could
have written down that formula, he had already
worked it out in his head, which of course
I could do now with perfect ease.
Bob Sheldon: What country did your grand-
father come from?
Joe Engel: He came from Russia. He and his
family lived near what was then known as
St. Petersburg, then later Petrograd, and later
Leningrad. They had to flee from Russia when
my mother was quite small because there were
pogroms at the beginning of the 20th century
and they were quite terrible. Many people emi-
grated from Russia and other countries as well,
near the beginning of the 20th century. Many of
them came to the United States and others went
to other countries, including the area that be-
came Palestine. That’s how my mother’s family,
including my mother, came to America. She was
five years old when she got here and enrolled
in kindergarten almost immediately. She spoke
typical American, unaccented English. As far as
I could tell, she was a typical young American
woman. When she had me in 1922, I was her
first child; she had been married about a year.
She graduated from high school when she was
18 and she was a real flapper. I’ve seen some pic-
tures of her. She looks just like anybody else in
the United States, a great mom.
Bob Sheldon: Did your grandfather have a
math background?
Joe Engel: I don’t know. I do know that he
had some Hebrew school training in the old
country. He obviously had received enough
formal instruction that he could keep ahead
of a junior high school student.
Bob Sheldon: Did you continue your interest
in math through high school?
Joe Engel: Absolutely. I was very fortunate.
The junior high that I went to was very special.
Not only was I able to learn mathematics there,
I was able to study the other conventional
courses. I also continued my journalism career
in junior high. I became an associate editor of
a junior high school newspaper, which was
printed on slick paper. Every year, we won the
New York City-wide competition for the best
newspaper on the junior high school level. It
wasn’t because of me. It was because of the
guy who endowed that junior high school. In
return his name was placed on the school, in ad-
dition to its number, which was Junior High
School 98. They had a journalism department
and the faculty advisor was a former associate
of the man who endowed the school. This man’s
name was Herman Ridder, so this was Herman
Ridder Junior High School. Herman Ridder was
the founder of the Ridder newspaper, which
later merged with Knight and became Knight
Ridder.
In high school the trend continued. When I
came to join the high school newspaper, it was
in my first year in high school. I was in the class
that would graduate in 1938, but that class had
started six months earlier. I was put into the sec-
ond class rather than the first class because I had
been in a rapid advance class in junior high
school. The kids who got there during the first
class had already snagged all the good positions
on the staff of the newspaper.
When I came in, I was accepted as a reporter.
I recall going into the office one day shortly after
school had started. I was about 14 years old at
the time. This other kid was 15. He was sitting
there with his legs up, on the chair or the desk
in front of him, smoking a cigar. He beckoned
me to come over to him. He said, ‘‘What are
you doing here, young man?’’ I explained to
him that I had just joined the staff and I was a re-
porter. And he said, ‘‘I’m one of the editors and
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I want you to go down to the corner store and
get me a box of cigars and something to drink.’’
I said, ‘‘No thank you, that’s not what I came here
for,’’ and I walked out. (Laughing) That was the
end, at that time, of my formal association with
journalism.
But I did continue studying English as well
as reading. I also continued to take whatever
courses were offered in the curriculum. I went
to a very extraordinary high school—Townsend
Harris. You had to pass an examination and you
had to be recommended to enter it. I was able to
do that because I had a good record in junior
high. Our high school curriculum was three
years. Once we were admitted they gave us
a good curriculum and as we approached our
senior year, some of us were already taking
college-level courses. For example, after ele-
mentary algebra I took advanced algebra, and
then both plane geometry and solid geometry.
I studied biology, chemistry, and physics. I took
calculus in my senior year. When I left high
school, I was very well equipped.
Bob Sheldon: You graduated from high school
in 1938. Were you affected by the Depression?
Joe Engel: Very much so. In fact, looking
back, it may well be that the reason that I didn’t
see my father around the house very often in the
years when my parents were still married was
that he was out looking for work. That’s what
many breadwinners did. I know that my mother
was taking care of her children as a single per-
son from 1932 on. Although I did see my father
for approximately one year, I didn’t see him af-
ter that. During that time he paid child support
and we were required to visit him once a month.
I was keenly aware of what the Depression did
to us. I was aware of it on the economic, politi-
cal, and social levels.
I observed that, generally speaking, the peo-
ple we mingled with were people who were
roughly in the same class that we were; charita-
bly described as lower middle class. Later on,
when my mother’s career as an independent
employee improved, we could say we were mid-
dle class.
Bob Sheldon: What was her career?
Joe Engel: The first job that she got was as a
bookkeeper. Her oldest brother, who was 10 or
12 years older than she was, was a very success-
ful accountant, although he was not certified.
He was sufficiently successful that he was one
of New York Governor Lehman’s financial ad-
visers. That’s how I learned that money is an im-
portant part of politics. He also became the
sponsor of every one of my male cousins who,
with only two exceptions, all became accoun-
tants. This included his two sons and the sons
of all my other aunts and uncles as well. He must
have influenced, just in the family alone, about
a dozen people to become accountants just like
him, because it was a good living and it was hon-
orable work. He wanted me and my younger
brother to become accountants too. However,
I was going to be a mathematician. He said,
‘‘That’s ridiculous. You’ll never make any money
as a math teacher or anything like that.’’
My mother said, ‘‘If my son wants to be a
mathematician, that’s what he is going to be.’’
She supported me in that endeavor and I’m so
grateful to her for having had the wisdom to al-
low me to pursue this wonderful newfound in-
terest that I had. A similar thing happened with
my younger brother. He wanted my brother to
go to a technical school because he didn’t seem
to have the same strong mathematical inkling
that I had and he thought that if he at least went
to a technical school he would learn something
practical. My mother said, ‘‘Absolutely not. He
goes to the same kind of liberal arts school that
Joseph goes to and that will be that.’’ I learned
the importance of money and how you can work
with it or without it.
Bob Sheldon: How did you choose your
college?
Joe Engel: In order to be admitted to the City
College of New York at that time, you had to
have 90 percent or higher on each of five different
Regents exams. I had to take exams in English,
French, mathematics, and two other subjects.
At Townsend Harris, we were guaranteed ad-
mission to City College if we merely completed
the curriculum at Townsend Harris, regardless
of what grades we got on the Regents. Al-
though we took the Regents, no one who grad-
uated from Townsend Harris ever got less than
a 92.
I decided that I would go to City College in
1938, because there wasn’t any place else that
I could go to, and that when I got there, I would
immediately sign up for ROTC, Reserve Offi-
cers Training Corps.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. JOSEPH H. ENGEL
Page 62 Military Operations Research, V19 N2 2014
Bob Sheldon: Which service of ROTC did you
choose?
Joe Engel: I went into the Army. The idea was
that when I finished the four-year course, I
would be commissioned a reserve officer at the
rank of Second Lieutenant in the Army.
I tried to get into West Point during my first
year at City College, but was not able to get a po-
litical appointment, and there was no other way
of getting in. I couldn’t have gone to West Point,
and I soon discovered this and stopped trying,
because it was useless. I was perfectly happy
to stay at City College and I got my education
that way.
Bob Sheldon: Did you take a lot of math
courses at City College?
Joe Engel: I certainly did. We started off with
differential and integral calculus. I had to repeat
the calculus course on the college level, and that
was a breeze, because they weren’t teaching me
anything that I didn’t already know.
They may have broadened my knowledge
somewhat, just as at some point in college, I
learned that there were other forms of geometry
than Euclidian geometry. What I learned at City
College was a deepening and a broadening of
what I had already learned; nothing completely
new, not even in the field of ROTC. There were
things that I had already learned that were be-
ing elaborated upon in ROTC.
The fact that people went to war was not
news to me. The fact that infantry was the way
ground soldiers fought wars and the general
kind of information about the weapons that
they had and the vehicles that they used and
so on, I already knew about it.
I knew that the cavalry rode on horses and
I knew that they had begun to use armored,
tracked, and wheeled vehicles to a limited de-
gree, but they still had a lot of horse cavalry
and they still had a hell of a lot of fighting that
had to be done on foot, by foot soldiers with rifles
or pistols and bayonets.
I learned in greater detail what it was like to
be an officer in command of ground troops.
Ground troops generally fought with handheld
weapons and marched long distances, some-
times under the cover of darkness, a forced
(paced) march. This would get you to an objec-
tive at a point in time where you might be able
to take the enemy by surprise.
Bob Sheldon: You did that when you were in
ROTC?
Joe Engel: Absolutely, and we studied a lot.
We read about the Revolutionary War and the
Civil War. The Civil War was somewhat more
modern than the Revolutionary War, but not
completely different. But in the Civil War and
in some of the other wars that we had been fight-
ing, we were always learning a few new things.
The model of warfare before the United
States came into existence consisted mainly of
what Lanchester called ancient warfare, and
that’s strictly hand-to-hand combat or with lim-
ited range weapons. It was similar to ship fight-
ing because once you got near another ship,
you’d try to board it and engage in hand-to-hand
combat to subdue the enemy crew and, if they
were sailing ships, destroy their rigging. You
could also try to ram another ship if you had
a good, strong point on the bow of your ship.
I already knew from just general knowledge
that there were many different things that you
had to worry about in warfare, whether on land
or sea or, for that matter, in the air. I knew that
there were biplanes and monoplanes and that
sometimes, these guys shot at each other with
machine guns. Sometimes, the aircraft drop-
ped whatever size or type bombs they had on
board on various land targets. I mean, these
are things that everyone knew from reading
the newspapers.
When I took ROTC, I was learning the
principles of warfare, both in the ancient sense,
because we still were fighting a lot of ancient-
style wars, and also in a more modern sense.
The term ‘‘modern warfare,’’ which was used
by Lanchester, had a specific definition. This
was warfare in which you had weapons that
could destroy at a greater distance and in which
you could see all your targets. That is, you could
aim, fire, and cause destruction at a distance.
Another type of warfare was guerilla war-
fare, in which one side or the other could hide
and fire from concealed positions. Lanchester
came up with four different kinds of warfare:
ancient warfare; modern warfare, in which both
sides were exposed; guerilla warfare, in which
one side was exposed and the other not; and
warfare in which both sides were hidden. The
equations for each of these were different, and
although I didn’t learn about Lanchester
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warfare at City College, I learned about it soon
after, along with the Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern.
One of the things that I learned at City Col-
lege, which has a very direct bearing on military
operations research (OR), was how to develop
an estimate of the situation. It came up in my ex-
perience in a context of infantry operations and
it was a form of developing tactics for fighting
based on particular kinds of battles.
Suppose, for example, you’ve been march-
ing down a road and it’s a nice, cleared field.
At the end of this field is fairly heavy woodland.
Your original plan was to walk down to the end
of this field and make a right turn because that’s
where the road goes.
Then you make a left turn another mile
later, and you go down another road and even-
tually, you get to a place where you are to arrive
just as it gets dark. You’re going to enter a biv-
ouac for the night, and you’re going to attack
the enemy who is entrenched just a little ways
further in the next woods down. The troops that
had already been fighting there will have to be
relieved and brought out. You will go to their lo-
cation at night, under cover of darkness, to re-
lieve them.
But while you’re walking down this road on
this sunny summer day, you’ve been chatting
with your troops and seeing how they’re doing.
Then you’re walking along at the head of your
platoon and you’re talking to your platoon ser-
geant and suddenly, you’re fired at by machine
guns from the woods just 50 yards in front of
you.
What do you do? I actually was tested this
way in a two-sided maneuver. After I had been
commissioned, I was doing this with real troops
and the Army knew that you’d all benefit
greatly from the experience of two-sided ma-
neuvers. They had referees to see what we were
doing. What we had to learn while we were in
training was how to deal with situations like
this.
When this actually happened to me in train-
ing, I flunked the first part because the enemy
opened fire on us with machine guns, and here
I was, at the head of the platoon, which consisted
of two squads in the rifle section and two in the
mortar or heavy section.
The men in the front section fired rifles and
they had bayonets that they could use; some of
them had Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs). In
the heavy section, the weapons platoon, they had
light air-cooled machine guns and 60-millimeter
mortars. These were too heavy to be carried by
one man, and they had to be put together and
mounted to be fired.
What do you think my platoon sergeant
did when we were fired at by these machine
guns?
Bob Sheldon: Probably jumped in the ditch.
Joe Engel: He did better than that. He yelled,
‘‘Down!’’ and we all jumped into the ditch, and
that’s what I should have done. But I had to fig-
ure it out and it took me two seconds longer.
Had he not done it and had we been standing
there for another two seconds, it’s quite possible
that more of my men would have been wounded
and killed.
I flunked that part of it, but what do you do
when you’re pinned down by enemy fire like
this almost in the open? That’s where the esti-
mate of the situation comes in.
You first have to know your position and
the enemy’s position and the terrain and how
it could influence the battle that has just begun.
In this particular instance, which is an experience
that we actually went through, as soon as you’re
fired upon, you’ve got to take cover. I didn’t do it
fast enough.
More specifically, the situation I had to deal
with is the situation we had studied in school.
The enemy troops firing at us were on the right
side of the road as we were approaching it.
This was a straight country road with occa-
sional right angles with it around the various
quarter sections, with two slight ditches on both
sides. There’s earth on the sides and grass along
the middle of the top of the road, and ruts be-
tween the two sides of the grass.
And here we were, being fired at by a small
force consisting of two machine guns. We’ve got
about 20 rifles and four BARs. We’ve got some
pistols, but they’re not much good at a distance.
Our men have bayonets, but we’re not ready
to use them yet. It wouldn’t happen until you get
into close combat, if you’ve got time. We also
have our light machine guns and 60-millimeter
mortars. What are you going to do now to drive
these men away and keep them from impeding
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your forward progress so that you can get to your
objective at the assigned time?
You have to do an estimate of the situation,
which, if you’re lucky, you had studied when
you were a kid in school, and you know what
to do. You lay out, in horizontal rows, your op-
tions and you lay out, in the vertical columns,
the enemy’s options.
Frankly, I don’t think the enemy had much
in the way of options, at least not the unit that
was opposing us. He could stay exactly where
he was and keep firing until he’s destroyed or
he could instruct the second one to withdraw
while the first one is still firing. In other words,
that would be a holding action on their part, be-
cause they knew they had been met by a supe-
rior force, although, if they had heavy machine
guns or the equivalent, they might not necessar-
ily have been an inferior force. Or, they might
decide, when this one machine gun withdraws,
maybe he could pull a flanking movement of
some sort under cover and come out on our left
flank, because that’s where the cover was in the
woods, on the left side. And then, while we’re
busy firing at the guy who’s in front of us
and slightly to our right, the flanker suddenly
starts firing at us from our left and slightly to
our rear. We have to take these three things into
account.
Similarly, we have things to decide. What
are we going to do? I might get my weapons pla-
toon into position somewhere. I might bring the
mortars up to where they have a clear field of
fire that can come down on those machine guns.
I could stay in concealment and the enemy can’t
do anything. On the other hand, I could direct
the machine guns to get forward on the left flank
without revealing their positions and set up and
start firing from the left flank.
I would then have three options for us, three
options for them, and I’d have nine boxes that
show the interactions. I would write down, in
those boxes, what was going to happen. And
I would then choose my tactic that would be
the best if the enemy used the tactic in that col-
umn, and the same for each column.
I would then pick as my strategy the one
that gives me the maximum attack, regardless
of what the enemy does, in each of the different
positions. In other words, if he’s fighting in the
way it says in column one, I have to figure out
which of these three strategies is going to be best
for me.
Then I look at those three maximums and
I choose the minimum of those three maxi-
mums. If I do that, I know I will be doing that
well or better. So that’s the strategy I choose.
The min-max is the conservative solution,
and if the enemy does the same, he chooses a cer-
tain max-min for him. If I choose the max-min
and he chooses the min-max, it’s a zero-sum
game.
That’s what we were taught in school and it’s
exactly the way von Neumann and Morgenstern
saw these problems of zero-sum two-person
games with perfect information.
Bob Sheldon: Did you take ROTC all four
years of college?
Joe Engel: Yes, I did. At the conclusion of col-
lege, I had not only finished my four years of
ROTC, I had finished my four years of every-
thing else and I had been given a good educa-
tion in all of these fields.
I didn’t do much singing in those days, but
I took two years of public speaking. This was
a required course for people who were taking
a major in secondary school education or a mi-
nor in it. I passed it, so that I was a good public
speaker, at least in theory.
Also, in ROTC, one of the things we had to
do was learn how to give oral commands that
could be heard in conditions of combat and con-
fusion. One of the things they used to do to us
was to line us up across the width of a football
field. The field is 100 yards long and approxi-
mately 50 yards wide. They would line up about
a half-dozen 12-man squads. They changed our
weapons from Springfield rifles to Garand ri-
fles, the primary rifle that our troops used in
WW II, so we were getting up-to-date training.
We were squad leaders and had to drill our
squads. In the first two years, we were enlisted
men, and we had simulated ranks of corporal.
We had to drill them in school of the soldier.
School of the soldier is the term for how you
march in formation and follow all of the orders.
You also had to know how to carry and move
your weapon. You had to know how to do ‘‘for-
ward march’’ and you had to know how to say
‘‘forward’’ slightly drawn out, because that’s
the preparatory command, and ‘‘march’’ is the
command of execution.
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They had six squads lined up and six of us
as officers on the other side of the field, each
of us 50 yards away from our troops, who had
to hear and recognize us as the ones who were
giving the command—not the officer next to us.
We had to be sufficiently distinctive that they
could hear our voices, and we had to be able to
get them to do those maneuvers promptly. It
was right shoulder arms, left shoulder arms,
present arms, fix bayonets. You had to give them
the commands and they had to obey them with-
out question and rapidly.
In the second year, we studied history as
well as tactics and strategy, using models from
history, including the Civil War, where there
wasn’t yet much in the way of guerilla warfare.
These movements of units into fixed com-
bat, which is the way the Romans fought and
the Greeks fought and the British fought in all
of these wars, was changing very slowly. That
in itself was an education, seeing how the face
of warfare was changing rapidly in WW I to be-
gin with, and in WW II even more so.
In ROTC, we mimicked the military promo-
tions. Generally, promotions were associated
with your years in ROTC, so that most people
became corporals their second year, and we all
became commissioned officers in our third year
and got a promotion in our fourth year. If your
service was exceptional, you might become
a sergeant in the second year, and you might rise
to first lieutenant or captain by the time the four
years were up.
These promotions meant higher responsi-
bility, so I was increasing my managerial ex-
perience. I remember being a corporal, and a
second and a first lieutenant, with increased
responsibilities and larger numbers of people
to lead and manage. The same thing happened
when WW II started, and I was called to active
duty.
I started out as a second lieutenant in the
Infantry, and my first duty station was Fort
Benning, Georgia, where they put me through
the same kind of 90-day course that they used
for people who had no previous training. With
us, they called it a refresher course. I cannot say
they taught me anything that I hadn’t already
been exposed to, but I got more practice doing
those things. Thereafter, I was put into an active
Army unit.
I was assigned to the 95th Infantry Division,
which was part of the Third Army Corps. At first,
I was an ordinary rifle platoon leader. I had ap-
proximately three dozen men under my com-
mand; three squads of twelve men each, plus a
platoon sergeant, and a couple of section ser-
geants. I had to supervise and manage this pla-
toon. I had to lecture to these guys and teach
them left from right. I had to teach them school
of the soldier, which were the elementary move-
ments for close-order drill.
Later in the war I flew as a B-29 navigator,
flying 39 missions over the Pacific and Japan.
Bob Sheldon: WW II started during your se-
nior year in college?
Joe Engel: We had not yet entered WW II
while I was in my senior year, but the war was
definitely going on and the news was bad. Paris
fell in 1940. In my junior and senior years, things
were looking very bad for the Allies. Roosevelt
had initiated Lend-Lease by that time and we
had been supporting the Allied war effort which,
in the transatlantic part of the battle, consisted
primarily of providing air cover for destroyers
and for lending the British our destroyers to pro-
tect their convoys that were carrying the supplies
that they needed.
As I learned later when I went to work for
the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), the
OEG did a lot of very important work in that
regard.
Bob Sheldon: How did you get recruited to
OEG?
Joe Engel: The personnel manager for OEG
gave me a spiel about what went on in the Navy,
and it sounded fascinating. I accepted the OEG
offer in 1949 because I was married at the time
and the salary they were offering me was the
best of all the offers, including prestigious edu-
cational institutions like Yale. This was my first
real professional job, outside of work I had done
in graduate school at the University of Wiscon-
sin as a teaching assistant.
Bob Sheldon: Can you elaborate about OEG’s
role in the protection of Atlantic shipping?
Joe Engel: What I can tell you about our pro-
tection of shipping during WW II in the Atlantic
is what I learned in our OEG indoctrination and
in conversations with people in OEG, and what
subsequently we used to do comparable work
in the postwar years.
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When we did antisubmarine work, we
worked on how destroyers would protect and
escort convoys crossing the Atlantic to bring
needed supplies, troops, and logistics. Also,
we worked on aircraft in support of these con-
voys and our own submarines in support of
them.
We had to combine lots of different kinds of
operations. When you screen a convoy with de-
stroyers, you have to know how fast the convoy
is going, whether it’s going to be making any
turns along its route, how big the convoy is,
and so on. You have to know the capabilities
of your own equipment, which would be pri-
marily those available in the earlier days of
WW II, some kind of sonar, which could listen
for submarines.
Based on that, you knew how far from your
destroyer you could detect an approaching sub-
marine or surface ship. You have to know how
to space your destroyers so that you can see far
enough to your flanks and to the sides of the con-
voy itself that you can detect approaching enemy
craft in time to prevent them from doing harm
to your convoy. This means you have to have
a curved screen of ships in the front and to some
distance around the flanks. One can work out
speed vectors to figure out what those angles
ought to be and you have to get your spacing
so that you don’t have gaps in the line.
One of the concepts that they came up with
early in WW II was the concept of a nonuniform
sweep width, the idea being that when you use
something like sonar, it may be pretty strong di-
rectly in front of your ship along the direction
that you’re going, but less strong to the sides.
When you know how good your sonar is,
you can have a pretty good feeling, based on
data, experiments, and prior experience. You
will have a good estimate of what the probabil-
ity is that an enemy target of some particular
kind will be detected if it’s going to come in, let’s
say, two nautical miles to the left or right of the
actual track of the particular ship that is doing
this sonar work.
If you take that probability and you inte-
grate the probability curve along the line per-
pendicular to your direction, you get a result
that tells you the average distance at which you
will detect your convoy. That tells you if you
had a broom that detected everything at that
width and you had the spacing that you do, the
proportion of ships that you get would be the
sweep width divided by the distance between
two adjacent ships. So that’s the concept of a
sweep width.
Bob Sheldon: Who taught you about antisub-
marine warfare (ASW)?
Joe Engel:We learned this initially in indoctri-
nation courses, which were held for newcomers
in the OEG, and this was a recapitulation of what
these guys had learned on the job during WW II.
They had some very bright, sophisticated people
doing this work.
Bob Sheldon: Do you remember the names of
any of those folks?
Joe Engel: The first peacetime director of the
OEG was Jacinto (Jay) Steinhardt, and he had
been a member of the wartime ASWORG, Anti-
submarine Warfare Operations Research Group,
which is what the Navy called that group. He
was personally involved in this kind of work, es-
pecially in the portion of the Atlantic closest to
South America, because there were convoys go-
ing to and from South America.
He saw to it that we were taught knowledge
based on the accumulated experience developed
during WW II, and in which we got initial guid-
ance and ideas from the British, who had been
doing these things before we started to do them.
Bob Sheldon: What other kinds of training
did you get at OEG?
Joe Engel:We were trained in air warfare and
surface warfare. We were taught not only how
to screen convoys in protecting convoys, but
we were taught how to look for a lost target—a
target that had been detected, maybe damaged
and was sinking, or was just plain lost. You were
not in contact with them and you had to con-
duct some sort of search pattern to find them.
You did this with whatever you were using
to search—surface ships, helicopters, aircraft,
could be anything.
Bob Sheldon: Did Koopman teach that?
Joe Engel: Bernie Koopman taught search.
Bob Sheldon: Were you in a classroom with
others?
Joe Engel: Yes. Depending on how big the
newcomers in that particular year were, there
might have been anywhere from 10 to 20.
For example, when searching with aircraft,
the primary detection instrument is radar, and
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radar was similar to sonar in the sense that it en-
ables you to get a good picture of where things
are at a distance.
It’s using light waves rather than sound
waves, and light waves travel a lot faster and
they travel in the medium of the atmosphere,
rather than the water. The refraction problems
are not as great, but certainly, they’re different.
What you are seeing with your radar is some
solid object in the atmosphere that is on the sur-
face or above the surface of the ocean.
With good radar, you actually get a good
map of where you’re flying, in addition to little
bright blips on the screen. Say you are over open
water, so there is nothing else bouncing back;
then you can detect a flying object like an air-
craft, or you can detect a little rock sticking
up out of the ocean, which might be dense
enough to give you a reflection on your radar,
and which you might confuse with a reflection
from a ship.
You have to worry about errors of the first
and second kind. An error of the first kind is a
failure to detect a target when it’s present. An
error of the second kind is a detection of some-
thing that is not a target or that may not even
have been present.
There sometimes were instances of anoma-
lous propagation, which is very similar to what
happens when you see a mirage in the desert.
Refraction brings into range something that
might have been actually below the horizon, be-
cause of the curvature of the light wave.
When you look at a mirage and you see
a beautiful city floating in the sky above you,
which could be a real city over the horizon
brought to you through anomalous propaga-
tion. You have to be sufficiently well-trained
to recognize these symptoms.
We also learned a lot of theoretical things.
Mentioning Professor Bernard Koopman re-
minded me of some of these. He was very
well-versed in the general mathematics of pre-
dictive situations and specifically about detec-
tion of small targets using radar or sonar.
At one point, we had what was known as
a double blip hypothesis. You couldn’t be sure
that you had actually detected a target unless
you saw the blip at the same place on two suc-
cessive rotations of the radar beam around full
circumference and returned to that spot.
There was also an ‘‘operator factor.’’ You
could compare what you actually observe un-
der operational conditions with the degradation
between the ideal performance and the actual
performance under controlled conditions. This
operator factor was a probability that the opera-
tor would detect a target if the target was pre-
sented.
Bob Sheldon: The classes you took at OEG
from Professor Koopman and others, did they
give you homework and exams?
Joe Engel: We did do a certain amount of
homework. I don’t think we got exams. It wasn’t
a question of having to pass a course, it was
a question of really learning and we all wanted
to learn.
There had been people who did not sur-
vive the first year at OEG. I was told by one
of my colleagues that I did not do well in my
first year (I was told this 10 or 15 years later,
by the way). I should have known this because
I didn’t get a raise that year. I was sufficiently
new. I was hired in 1949, which made me sec-
ond generation at OEG. I was definitely junior
to the wartime group and didn’t have the same
viewpoints they did. At the time, I was fat,
dumb, and happy, and I did my job and I wasn’t
overly upset that I didn’t get a raise the first
year. I would have liked one, but I didn’t even
know whether I was supposed to expect to get
one.
Bob Sheldon: After you finished your train-
ing, what was the first project?
Joe Engel: I was working initially on air war-
fare. I was given some data to analyze that had
been collected by my team leader, who was off
on one of these exercises at which data was be-
ing collected.
Bob Sheldon: Who was the team leader?
Joe Engel: His name was Douglas Brooks. He
gave me some data and I enjoyed working on it.
I was able to figure out the probability of detec-
tion as a function of distance. I was able to deter-
mine the detection curve, and I did something
very interesting with that data over and above
getting the detection curve. The data were not
quite as extensive as a classical statistician might
like. We had maybe 50 trials in all and they cov-
ered more than one set of circumstances.
When you study statistics in school, you
learn about confidence limits. This enables you
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to draw one curve above the mean curve, which
shows a higher probability at a given range, and
another curve below, which shows a lower
probability at that range.
You can then state that there is a 95 percent
chance that the true mean will fall between
these two curves. That enables you to make an
optimistic prediction against a pessimistic con-
dition. We put out an OEG study that analyzed
a particular radar and an aircraft detecting a spe-
cific kind of target, and it had these confidence
limits on it.
For me, it was a first. I had never applied
these confidence limits to anything in the real
world before, but I recognized that it was ap-
propriate to do it here, because the data were
less than copious. That’s often the case, be-
cause we always have limited resources to
work with.
I’ve always been interested in learning prac-
tical limitations on the validity of our findings,
and this is a very important tenet of OR. To be
honest and true to your client, you have to let
your client know any reservations you have,
and you have to let him know why you have
these reservations so that he can understand just
what the circumstances are that led you to the
conclusions that you drew and the recommen-
dations that you made.
He may have sufficient other experience
that enables him to say, ‘‘Given those circum-
stances, I will accept your recommendations
based on what else I know; or I won’t.’’ He has
to have that prerogative, and it’s up to you to
give him the best possible information you can
about any reservations you may have concern-
ing your findings.
Bob Sheldon: After looking at air detection,
what was your next major project?
Joe Engel: I did one or two things while I was
on that air defense team, then I went down to
Key West to work with VX-1, the Navy’s test
squadron. In between, I also worked as a liaison
with someone who did subcontracting for us. I
went to the University of Michigan, where one
of our people was stationed, and he and a team
did work for OEG. We had to go there from time
to time to review the work and bring them
a new assignment that we wanted worked on,
and we needed someone there to make sure that
they got exactly what it was that we had in
mind. I went there maybe once a month or every
other month and just spent a few days on any
given occasion.
At the same time, we did air ASW work, and
I was attached to a squadron known as ZX-11,
based in Lakehurst, New Jersey. What did the
Z stand for? Zeppelin. This was the Navy blimp
squadron attached to the OPDEVFOR, which
stands for Operational Development Force that
later changed to Operational Test and Evaluation
Force (OPTEVFOR), to test the equipment that
might be put to use by blimps.
If a helicopter could dunk a sonar in the wa-
ter, so could a blimp. At least, that was the rea-
soning. Blimps could also drop mines in the
water and maybe with great accuracy, because
they didn’t have a terrific forward motion and
more silently, because they could come drifting
in without their engines being on. If they came
in by night with their lights off and their propel-
lers not going, they might be very hard for an en-
emy to detect. They could drop their mines and
leave surreptitiously and the enemy wouldn’t
even know they’d been there.
This was very interesting for me, because of
the operational and analytical problems associ-
ated with it. There were some big ones that
were, by then, real zeppelins; the difference be-
tween a blimp and a zeppelin is the blimp did
not have a rigid framework. It was more like
a balloon. The zeppelin had a rigid framework,
like the Hindenburg. The Hindenburg was the
one that blew up.
Our zeppelins had that same possibility, but
by then we had shifted from hydrogen, which
was the very explosive fuel that blew up the
Hindenburg, to helium, which is an inert gas
and you don’t have the danger of explosion. I
had the fun of traveling around in blimps and
balloons.
Bob Sheldon: After you took the class, did you
go out on ships to verify what was going on?
Joe Engel: I did get involved in this kind of
ASW, but with a slight difference, in the sense
that I seldom was involved directly with fleet
units that were doing antisubmarine work, al-
though occasionally I was.
In 1952, I was attached to an antisubmarine
organization in Key West called VX-1, VX mean-
ing ‘‘aircraft experimental’’ and ‘‘1’’ was the
number of the squadron. The man that I relieved
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was Howard Kreiner. It was an Air Development
Squadron for antisubmarine purposes. They
were stationed in Boca Chica, Florida, which is
about three miles up the causeway toward
Miami from Key West. They were functioning
as a part of OPDEVFOR.
OPDEVFOR has counterparts in the other
military services. A lot of these people knew
each other. Ellis Johnson, for example, who was
the director of the Operations Research Organi-
zation of the US Army, knew his counterparts,
Leroy Brothers in the Air Force’s organization
and Jay Steinhardt in the Navy’s organiza-
tion. They were friends and professional col-
leagues. During WW II, Ellis Johnson ran the
US mine warfare program that designed the
way these naval mining programs would be
taken care of.
When I flew as a navigator in WW II, I took
part in the campaign that Ellis Johnson had
waged, a campaign called Operation Starvation.
Its objective was to blockade the Japanese, so
they couldn’t get sufficient supplies coming into
Japan to maintain their armed forces, and so they
could not send sufficient supplies out to their
troops who were waging combat on other fronts
outside of the Japanese islands proper.
It turned out that my experience in the mil-
itary was germane to what was going on in the
Navy’s mine warfare efforts that were current
and projected for the future. And it was relevant
to my ASW test work.
The purpose of OPDEVFOR is to test and
evaluate systems of weapons or detection sys-
tems that are being used for some specific pur-
pose, and which the Navy is considering
ordering in sufficiently large quantities that the
fleet can use it. This is clearly a very important
function, and unless you have ways of checking
performance against the specifications for which
the equipment is being built, you have no really
good way of determining which, of perhaps sev-
eral different systems, you want to acquire.
When a manufacturer prepares a prototype
prior to the contract to actually acquire them
in mass quantities, he does his best to produce
something that meets the specifications that
they’re bidding on. He has his best scientists
and experienced technicians working on devel-
oping the equipment and then actually using it.
They are skilled professionals, one hopes, and
they should know a lot about getting the best
they can out of the equipment.
It might well be the case that if the equip-
ment is submitted to whatever trials the Navy
wanted, and these professional personnel used
it under fairly idealized conditions, the equip-
ment might well perform according to specifica-
tions. On the other hand, if this equipment is
designed to be used at sea, and it is to be used
by seamen and officers who may not be quite
as expert as the scientists and engineers who de-
veloped the equipment in the first place, and the
technicians who helped put it together who were
very well versed in all the ins and outs of how
to use this equipment, and they were using it
under ideal conditions, the professionals might
do better than a typical Naval team, which didn’t
have the opportunity to get quite this extensive
training.
You need to observe the equipment under
operational conditions being used by people
who would be using it in combat when it’s try-
ing to do its job in the real world. That’s what we
did at Key West in VX-1.
They were an Air Development Squadron
for undersea warfare. At the time that I was
there, they were evaluating several aircraft and
helicopter-mounted equipment for this purpose.
They had patrol aircraft, which had various
kinds of radars that could look for surface ship-
ping, submarines on the surface, or even their
periscopes.
Howard told me what was going on, some
of which I would have to take over because
his tour of duty was up. One of the things had
to do with the evaluation of active sonars; the
vessel that was going to carry them was a heli-
copter. The helicopter was going to take a sonar
dome, known as a transponder, which sent out
sound and received echoes of sound back. We
would go out to the location, lower the sonar
dome into the water while hovering over the
water, with the idea being that the sound the he-
licopter made in the atmosphere would not
travel through the water. So an enemy subma-
rine that was listening for other ships or looking
for other aircraft would not be very likely to spot
the helicopter low over the surface of the sea
when they were looking at a couple of thousand
feet up. Consequently, we could look for subma-
rines without ourselves being discovered. They
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. JOSEPH H. ENGEL
Page 70 Military Operations Research, V19 N2 2014
would turn on the sonar, send out their pings of
sound, and hope that they bounce off something
that might be a target—although it might just be
rocks on the bottom. If there’s a little echo that
has come back, the sound reflects back to the
dome, which also has a receiver in it, and that
sound is received and it goes through the elec-
tronic circuitry and shows as a blip on a screen.
Howard told me I would have to learn how
to analyze and develop tactics for such a thing.
The tactics for dipping sonar are going to be
very different from the tactics that are con-
ducted by a ship or an aircraft that moves con-
tinuously. He said that what you’re going to
have to do is somehow represent what happens
when the dome is down here; and then you pick
it up and you have to carry it to another location
and lower it there. Completely different from
anything that we’ve ever done before, because
these are just spot looks. I thought that was go-
ing to be dull, however, when I got into it and
I started drawing these circles and got into the
swing of things, I discovered there were lots of
fascinating problems in it. You had to analyze
what amounted to continuous motion. You had
to be able to pick the sonar dome up, then move
far enough along that if you’re screening a con-
voy you don’t get overtaken by the convoy. You
don’t get too far ahead and you lower the dome
and you stay motionless there while the convoy
is speeding up. If you get too close to it, you’re
not doing your job because you’re not finding
the enemy soon enough. There are lots of side is-
sues in this. I had something that was very re-
petitive, but required a lot of thought. It was
fascinating for me, and I would invent some
tactics. I would draw diagrams on a chart,
a simulated place where this was going on, un-
der certain conditions, and I would consider
how this particular circle would act during
the period when the dome was down. Then
they’d pick it up—they’d accelerate from zero
speed forward to carry it ahead of where it
was before, fast enough to exceed the speed of
the convoy, stop, move to a hover position, go
down, listen again to the dome, pick up, discover
perhaps that the convoy is turning so they’ve got
to turn also. You have to work out all these de-
tails, and I developed some visual aids in which
I had a circle representing the region within
which there were three zones.
From that, if you conduct enough experi-
ments, you learn lots of things about the sonar.
You learn the distribution of distances, both for-
ward and on the side, that a target of a given
type will be detected.
They would run experiments in which sub-
marines would try to make a passage in a given
direction and they would come from far enough
out that they would initially be out of range, so
that it would be necessary for the sonar to detect
something. Then they could measure the dis-
tance and direction at which that detection took
place and they could track it and they could get
data under operational conditions.
Bob Sheldon: The objects they were trying to
detect, did they use Red subs or our own sub-
marines for the test?
Joe Engel: We were working on a variety of
subs. We may have had some old German sub-
marines that we had captured or rehabilitated
after WW II and used those. We had other
kinds of submarines of our own. We had stan-
dard, conventional submarines. We had GUPPY
(Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Pro-
gram) submarines, which is what we called
the snorkeling submarines. Eventually, we had
nuclear submarines.
The ships of various sizes and capabilities
and speeds and the information that you get
from these kinds of ships are comparable to ships
of that kind, regardless of who has them. Unless
one ship in the Navy of one country might have
some equipment that quiets the ship, this is one
of the things one has to worry about and develop
ways of accommodating it. But generally speak-
ing, the spectrum of kinds of submersible targets
that we could provide were quite comparable to
what some putative, hostile type might put up
against us. So it was definitely relevant.
Bob Sheldon: Did you test under various en-
vironmental conditions, e.g., the currents and
the ambient temperatures, to wash that out as
a factor?
Joe Engel: Yes, the currents and the ambient
temperatures were always very important be-
cause sound waves are strongly refracted within
the water. And if the temperature differs near the
surface from what it is below, you can get tre-
mendous curvature of an upward or downward
nature, which will severely affect the ability to
detect targets beyond certain ranges.
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There is a phenomenon in large bodies of
deep water known as a thermocline. The ther-
mocline is a boundary between layers of hot
and cold water, the cold being below. So on
a warm summer day, there will be a sharp dif-
ference between the warm surface water and
the cooler water below.
That may easily be down to a depth of 100
meters as the divide. The sound wave tends to
be bent upward, so if you are sending your
sound waves out and they hit the thermocline
and they bend upward, that limits their range
and they won’t be able to get deep targets out
as far as they would if the conditions were more
favorable. They definitely worked under a vari-
ety of conditions so they could take these factors
into account.
Bob Sheldon:Who did you report that data to?
Joe Engel: We reported that to the command-
ing officer of VX-1 and his staff. There were sev-
eral engineers on his staff who were responsible
for conducting these experiments and data col-
lection trials. We worked very closely with
them, observing the actual trials, discussing
what their plans were, and giving them designs
to test a particular piece of equipment.
When they conducted these trials, we went
along on some of the naval units that were in-
volved in the trials. I made many flights in the
helicopters that were dipping their sonars down
in the water.
I found the experience of flying in the heli-
copter while they were doing these evaluations
fascinating, because it was an early Sikorsky he-
licopter. In the very warm climate of Key West
and off the shore area there in Southern Florida
and the nearby Gulf of Mexico, the Sikorsky was
underpowered and did not have much lift. They
could barely carry a pilot, a copilot, and a sonar
dome. Under normal operational conditions,
the copilot not only would tell the pilot when
it was time for them to make a change in posi-
tion so the pilot could rest, the copilot could also
function as the observer who monitored the so-
nar and could see whether or not it was detect-
ing any targets. It could do the work, but if it
carried somebody extra like an observer (me),
then it was underpowered. To overcome that,
they had to strip the helicopter of most of its
skin to lighten it, except for the floorboards
where the pilot was sitting and the windshield
to protect him from wind blowing into his eyes.
With that in mind, we had a nice breezy flight,
because we were not protected on the sides.
There was a breeze because when we were pick-
ing up the dome and going from one spot to an-
other, we flew around 80 knots. That’s pretty
fast.
There were just a bunch of essential struts
and framework, metal pipes linked together to
hold the helicopter to its proper shape so that
there was a little bit of a fuselage in the back
and the tail rotor would be in the right place
and this was all rigidly mounted so it would
function correctly. With that, they had enough
power that they were able to do their job.
The weather was glorious. We were flying
somewhere between 20 and 50 feet over the
surface, and we could look down into the
lovely green waters of the Gulf of Mexico or
the Atlantic, whichever side we were on, usu-
ally it was the Atlantic. We could see the ma-
rine life and we could see the coral. We could
see the dolphins, the squid, the manta rays,
and the barracudas. It was gorgeous, and it
was as if you are in a low slung convertible
and the breezes were blowing and you could
see all this beauty beneath you. It was a won-
derful experience! I wouldn’t have missed that
for the world.
Bob Sheldon: Do you recall in your experi-
ments any results that surprised your customers?
Joe Engel: We didn’t get surprised as much
as informed because we only knew that the
sonar was supposed to have certain detection
capabilities, and it was our job to find out if it
did. They never came up with more than we ex-
pected. That would have been a surprise. But
they often came up with less, and that’s what
we were expecting. The fact that they came up
with less did not mean that the equipment was
no damn good, or that the vendor was trying to
cheat the government.
It meant that we were using it under opera-
tional conditions in which we knew, from all the
prior experience, which things didn’t work as
well in the heat of combat with your normal line
personnel as opposed to the technical experts on
shore who had built and developed and fine-
tuned this stuff.
Bob Sheldon: When you worked in Florida,
did you live down there?
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Joe Engel: Yes. I was able to bring my family
and we had housing on a naval base. The place
was called Sigsbee Park by the officials who
allowed us to rent a nice little one-story bunga-
low with two bedrooms, a living room, dining
room, and kitchen. But we didn’t call it Sigsbee
Park; we called it Dredgers Key, because this
housing development of around 100 homes
was built around a huge circle. The land this
housing was built on was called marl, a mud
which contains clays and silt. Marl had been
dredged up from the bottom of the Gulf of
Mexico, which we were adjacent to on this side
of the Key. They just tamped down in shallow
water to build it up to get more land. It was on
this land, at least partly dredged up land, that
our homes were built. That was a lovely place.
When we were on field assignments that were
overseas for sufficient duration, and if peacetime
conditions were prevailing at the time, we were
allowed to bring our family with us.
This was in 1952. I had my wife, to whom
I had been married nine years, and we had two
small children. We didn’t have our first child un-
til I was in graduate school after the war. In the
last semester of my third year, we had our first
child, our daughter. We took her with us to Key
West, along with my second child, my son. My
daughter was two years old and my son was
about six months old. The conditions were ideal
for raising children. The weather was beautiful,
not too hot, not too cold, because there was al-
ways a sea breeze.
My wife was there full-time to look after our
children and she loved it. We had congenial
neighbors, most of whom were naval officers
who were attached to various units operating
in the area. We were totally accepted by the na-
val society in the region.
We enjoyed it very much and it was a very
smart thing to do, because people can work bet-
ter when they know that their families are well
taken care of and preferably, when their families
are around and don’t get in the way.
Bob Sheldon: You wrote an article in the
1950s on fitting Lanchester Equations (‘‘A Verifi-
cation of Lanchester’s Law,’’ Journal of the Opera-
tions Research Society of America, Vol. 2, No. 2 [May
1954], pp.163–171). Tell me about that.
Joe Engel: When I did this work, I was mod-
erately junior in OEG, and I still had a vivid
recollection of the various things we were taught
during the indoctrination course that all the be-
ginners had to go through. Part of that course
covered the Lanchester Equations, which came
in three varieties; ancient warfare, modern
warfare, and guerrilla warfare. Naturally, we
are in the age of modern warfare, because we
have weapons that can inflict casualties at a dis-
tance, whereas in ancient warfare it was pretty
much my sword against your shield, and your
mace against my head, and your dagger in my
stomach. Strictly hand-to-hand, nothing much
at a distance. Later, that evolved into throwing
spears and arrows, which could be construed
as an early example of modern warfare because
you could inflict casualties at a distance.
When I became interested in this, I was
aware of the history of the development of
Lanchester Equations, which came out in about
1916. Frederick Lanchester, had been an auto-
motive engineer at that early stage of the game.
He proclaimed himself also an aeronautical en-
gineer, even before there were any motorized
aircraft to speak of. He buttressed his argu-
ments, which were primarily theoretical, along
the lines we have just discussed, by reference to
some ancient historical battles like the battle
where Nelson defeated the French at Trafalgar.
Nelson did it by crossing the T, which meant
the British sailed their ships right through the
middle of the French ships, and they were able
to fire on both halves of the French ships as they
penetrated, before and after. Consequently they
were hitting more troops than the French were.
The French were only firing at a very narrow tar-
get, and they only had short use of it.
During WW II it might be presumed that the
Lanchester Equations were brought into some
situations when the context was appropriate.
Nevertheless, I don’t know that they were used
very much. Things tended to be much more tac-
tically based on the immediate characteristics of
the weapons and other systems being employed
in a particular engagement. Nothing much gen-
eralized beyond that.
The time came when I had a little experience.
I had been out to the field and I’d come back. I’d
started to take on some management responsi-
bilities. The associate director, Martin Ernst,
obtained from classified naval sources the statis-
tics on the casualties inflicted during the Battle
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of Iwo Jima. He also had the statistics as to how
many troops were put ashore by the US forces
during each day of the battle. And he had knowl-
edge of the size of the Japanese force at the time
of the beginning of the engagement and at the
end of the engagement. He had the daily casu-
alty figures on the American side. This was al-
most all the data that we needed to make sense
of the battle. If we had the casualty figures on
a daily rate of casualties for the Japanese, then
we would have a complete set of data. He also
had data on where the front lines were. And
he had a planimeter, a measuring instrument
used to determine the area of an arbitrary two-
dimensional shape. He could measure the length
of the front line, and he could measure the area
that was occupied by the US forces, and the area
that was occupied by the Japanese forces. The
Japanese were dug in; they had all sorts of caves
and ditches and redoubts in the portion of the is-
land of Iwo Jima that they still held. We had
what was left of it, which was fairly bare and ex-
posed to the forces that could fire at us from
higher altitudes.
He was trying to make sense of this and get-
ting nowhere, and he got called away on some
more urgent project. Then I was thrown this data,
literally into my lap. ‘‘Here Joe, see if you can
make some sense out of this.’’ I was delighted,
because almost immediately, the thought came
to me that we might be able to look at it with
Lanchester Equations to see whether they ap-
plied. I didn’t have quite enough information.
I lacked the information about Japanese casual-
ties, except that they went from roughly 22,000
to almost zero over a 45-day period, but I didn’t
know how it got there. I just knew that they
hadn’t been reinforced during this period, and
they all died off at the end of the battle. They
did not surrender. On the other hand, we had
all of this data about the actual land mass that
they were occupying, and that we were occupy-
ing. I decided that I was going to completely ig-
nore the area considerations and just think of it
as two forces facing one another, each of which
could fire at everybody in the other force. In a
certain sense, that was true. We could send our
artillery or mortars or long-range weapons to
any point on the island, if we chose to. They,
with more or less comparable weapons, could
certainly fire everyplace on the beach.
That’s the kind of situation that Lanchester’s
modern warfare equations were supposed to be
relevant to. I took that data, and I started trying
to analyze it. To come up with a specific set of
equations, I had to use the data that I did have
and try to get a casualty-producing rate that
the average weapons on the Japanese side could
multiply by the number of troops that they had
at a given time, to determine the rate at which
they would produce casualties on the American
side. That depended on the rate at which they
produced casualties, and how many troops we
had. Similarly, the other way. So there were
these two coefficients that were needed. I fig-
ured out a way of estimating the casualty-
producing rate of the Japanese from the data
that I had, but I didn’t have the rate at which
we could produce casualties on the Japanese,
because I didn’t know the rate at which we
could produce casualties. However, if you set
up the right kind of differential equation, and
you figure that the rates that you’ve got were
assumed to result from constant casualty rates,
you could fit the data on the one side into an
equation, and then choose two casualty rates,
which gave you as good as possible a fit to the ac-
tual data that you had on the American side. That
meant you had essentially 45 points to play with,
namely the casualties produced on the first, the
second and so on, through the 45th day when
the battle ended. That was pretty good under
the circumstances, even though we were dealing
with large numbers of forces; around 22,000 on
the Japanese side and the 50,000 that we finally
put ashore altogether on the US side.
With that large a sample, we could assume
that somehow we were working out pretty close
to the average, by the law of large numbers. With
that approach, I was able to derive these two
casualty-producing rates that we needed to bring
these equations to life. The nature of the process
would produce a very high coefficient of correla-
tion, when you compared what the equations
gave you to the actual data. You could also then
look at the results that you got from the equa-
tions that would fit the Japanese forces. You got
results which would be consistent with both
sides of the equation, if the results were correct,
and would give you a very high coefficient of
correlation with each side, if you examined com-
plete data on both sides. When I made this
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calculation, I didn’t do it with differential
equations. I did it with difference equations,
which in the limit become the same as differen-
tial equations. So it didn’t really matter, be-
cause one-forty-fifth of an interval is a pretty
small piece of it, so it’s going to be a good ap-
proximation. The coefficient of correlation of
the theoretical results with the actual results
on the US side was around 0.99. That, to me,
sounded like a very good fit.
When I made a graph that showed the num-
ber of survivors at the end of each day of com-
bat, it had a fairly steep rise on the first day to
something like 5,000 and then a drop on the sec-
ond day to about 3,000. Casualties were very
heavy, and the surf was roiled up and we
weren’t able to put any replacement troops
ashore. This had to be cranked into the equa-
tions, but that was fairly routine if you knew
what the replacement rates were. Then it went
up to a second peak on the third day, dropped
a little bit on the fourth day, then went up to
its final peak, very near two or three thousand
less than the total number of troops that we
had actually put ashore, on the fifth day. There-
after, the number of troops that the Americans
had declined gradually, slowing down in its de-
cline, in what amounted to a drawdown curve,
until at the end of the 45th day, we had some-
where between 20 and 30 thousand survivors
still effective on the field, whereas the Japanese
had been totally wiped out. They did not sur-
render when their forces got below what they
considered to be a viable level for them. The vi-
able level for continuing to fight was zero, and
that was the end; and only 200 of the 22,000 sur-
vived and were captured.
I was very pleased with our results. I
showed them to my immediate supervisor, Joe
Neuendorfer, who was active in the Operations
Research Society of America (ORSA) in those
early days. He was a WW II veteran of the naval
predecessor of OEG, so he had seen OR in the
days when it was first being born. When he
got this memo of mine, he saw its significance
immediately, and he insisted that we rewrite it
to make it into a study. We arranged to make
a presentation to a large audience of naval offi-
cers that were involved in the various kinds of
analyses that we were supposed to be helping
the Navy with.
There was an audience of between two and
four hundred people, and it was well received.
Shortly after that, I was walking through the
corridor in the Pentagon where we had our of-
fices, and I passed a newsstand, and stopped
to look at what they had on the newsstand. Lo
and behold there was a paperback that said,
The Battle of Iwo Jima. I took a look, flipped back
to the index, and found my casualty data. It had
been completely declassified, and my numbers
matched exactly what I had for the US troops.
I bought a copy, showed it to my supervisor
and the Director, and we all agreed that I should
make an unclassified publication out of this.
I wrote it up as a manuscript to be submitted
to Operations Research. We submitted it to the
Navy for clearance, because it had originally
been based on classified data, and they gave
it their OK. I submitted it for publication and
it was accepted, and it appeared in 1954. That
was my first published article on any phase of
OR, outside of what I had done professionally
within the confines of classified areas of OEG
and the Department of the Navy. I was very
happy about that. In the first year, it received
about 400 citations. It was quoted in that many
other documents.
Another thing of interest about the year 1954
is that was the first year the Lanchester prize was
awarded by ORSA, and Leslie Edie won the first
Lanchester prize. His article was on the effects of
platooning in highway traffic. (Editor’s note: Pla-
tooning is linking vehicles in a high-efficiency group
like a train without the train tracks.) If you pla-
tooned the cars by traffic lights, as they go
through the Holland Tunnel, the cars all travel
at close to the maximum rate of speed. No traffic
jam, so they get through faster, and they mini-
mize disturbances on the highway. I was think-
ing to myself, wouldn’t it have been poetic, if
the first Lanchester prize had been awarded for
validating the Lanchester equations.
Bob Sheldon: Did your Lanchester analysis
impact any operational analyses for current
day in the 1950s Navy operations?
Joe Engel: I would say yes, both directly and
indirectly. The direct way was in a planning sit-
uation. If you had a good estimate of what kind
of troops you were going against in some future
battle, and you knew how many troops there
were on the enemy side, and you knew what
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their capabilities were both of a defensive and
offensive nature, you could then take the vari-
ous weapons systems that you had on your side
and figure out how many troops you needed to
win the battle. You would have to state what
your criteria were for winning and losing, and
similarly for the other side, but when you make
all of these assumptions you can make the calcu-
lations and you can figure out what size force
you need. Obviously, the bigger force advantage
you have, the more your chances of winning are.
That’s the thing with the Lanchester square law,
you strike first with the most, and that’s a very
good tactic in general. If you have enough, you’ll
win. This was a direct usage that was used in
planning many attacks when things were re-
ally under control, and you could make good
estimates.
However, I think even more important than
that was this particular paper, which validated
a theoretical approach to the calculation of casu-
alties on both sides of the battle. It was very en-
couraging to analysts who were struggling with
the same kind of problem. It encouraged them
not only to use the Lanchester equations if they
wanted to, but to invent their own models, or to
set up simulations in which they could make be-
lieve they’re fighting a war, and collect the casu-
alty data and see what happens. As a result, the
entire field of calculating what happens in a war
was greatly encouraged to go ahead and think,
and get out of the box. Validate it, make sure
that it seems to work, and go ahead and use it.
I was glad that I came up with that result,
because I had no idea what was going to come
when that data was thrown into my lap.
Bob Sheldon: What was your next project af-
ter the VX-1?
Joe Engel: I came back to the Pentagon and
managed to buy my first house. We’d been liv-
ing in rental housing in the Washington area.
When I returned to the Pentagon, I got a pro-
motion. I was a team leader. I had been shifted
from undersea warfare, or air defense warfare,
this time to mining and mine countermeasures.
At first I functioned as what was called a scien-
tific analyst, which meant that it was my respon-
sibility to deal with the people in the Pentagon
who were on the staff, and concerned about
the conduct of mine warfare and mine counter-
measures. There were two staff placements that
did this. One was a staff organization that dealt
with mine warfare, and the other was devoted to
mine countermeasures. For a while, I functioned
as a scientific analyst to those organizations, and
then I became the team leader, within OEG, to
actually supervise the work that we did in the
home office on mine warfare. One of the people
on my team, who later replaced me, was Al Bot-
toms. I think he has retained an interest in min-
ing, and mine warfare, since those early days.
This was around 1954, shortly before I went
off on my next full-fledged field assignment to
the 7th Fleet in the Pacific.
I did a lot of fascinating work while I was
in mine warfare, and some of it got written up in
OEG publications. Some of it was presented in
big seminars that naval personnel would be in-
vited to. On one occasion, I did something that
was fairly new from a theoretical point of view.
There is the concept between the performance
of a system when it is in equilibrium, and the
performance of a system when it’s in a transient
state. That means it’s in a situation where things
haven’t steadied down, e.g., when you’re just
starting to lay a minefield, and you can only lay
so many mines a day.
If you started with an empty harbor and
you only sent one aircraft and it only dropped
one mine, that one mine is not going to close that
harbor. Most of the ships wouldn’t be sailing
near enough to it to trigger the mine. Sometimes
a ship bumps against one of the spikes that stick
out of an anchored mine floating up from the
bottom. Sometimes a ship creates a pressure
wave or a magnetic wave in the water. Some-
times there may be a change in some other
sensing mechanism that the mine can take ad-
vantage of. You have to lay lots of mines, and
it may take you a long time to get enough mines
laid that you get the level of effectiveness that
you’re looking for.
To really be able to talk well about what
you’re doing with your mines, you should un-
derstand the mathematics of minefields in tran-
sition, and how long it takes them to get up to
equilibrium.
You cannot think of the minefield as being
immediately in equilibrium. That means that
you have to set up what amounts to a set of par-
tial differential equations which pertain to the
whole system in which time is the primary
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variable. The other variables are the shipping
rates, the mine emplacement rates and the rate
of occurrence of false targets. Also, there is the
likelihood that when a mine blows up, it will ac-
tually destroy the target that caused it to blow
up. That would be what you are hoping for. If
the mine blows up and fails to destroy the tar-
get, that’s an error of the first kind. If, on the
other hand, the mine blows up because it re-
ceived some kind of signal that didn’t come
from a ship, this is an error of the second kind.
You have to take these into account, so you work
with partial derivatives that involve all these
kinds of things.
That’s where you get the idea of the mine-
field that is increasing in strength as you lay
mines, decreasing in strength as the mines are
blowing up under the shipping that they’re
out to get, so that eventually a balance is struck.
If you’ve laid enough mines, then the chances
are that you will be blowing up a large number
of ships, and you will do the job at the level that
you wanted to do.
This was important enough that when it
was done, we wrote it up. I also was ready to
submit an article for publication in Operations
Research, but I was beaten to the punch by an-
other analyst who worked for the Naval Ord-
nance Laboratory. We knew and dealt with
them, but they were not part of our organiza-
tion. Unbeknownst to us, we were both work-
ing on the same problem at the same time. He
came up with virtually identical equations and
models. I got to read his article and it was prac-
tically the same as mine. His article was submit-
ted for publication about a month before mine.
I had already published my article within clas-
sified naval channels; I then submitted it for
declassification. I had received an okay for de-
classification when I learned that this other guy
had beaten me to the punch.
On one occasion, I was asked to take this
work out to one of my colleagues in Hawaii at-
tached to the Commander-in-Chief US Pacific
Fleet (CINCPACFLT). He was there for a year
or two. Some of his work involved mines, and
clearly this was a subject that CINCPACFLT
might well be interested in. After some routine
calculations, people had a straightforward idea
of how long you’d have to work to expect that
your minefield was where you want it to be.
You’d learn the rate at which you could replenish
the field, and this would determine how often
you would revisit certain targets.
Bob Sheldon: The other gentleman who beat
you to publication, were his results the same
as yours?
Joe Engel: Pretty much the same. The math-
ematics, when you are dealing with systems in
transition, is much more complicated than the
mathematics of equilibrium. Time is involved,
and when you work with time, forward distance,
lateral distance, mass of the targets, and length,
it’s a multivariate problem. With time involved,
you have to calculate partial derivatives, the
rate of change of combinations of circumstances
in which perhaps only one variable is being ex-
amined. You hold all other things fixed, and
you get the amount of variation in your mea-
sure of effectiveness in terms of that particular
variable.
In equilibrium, nothing is changing. This is
much easier to solve because you set the deriva-
tives equal to zero. When you solve that equation,
the minefield is in equilibrium; but in transition
it’s much harder. That’s one of the things I was
able to do, and I got to visit Hawaii, and I fell
in love with it. I’d been there once briefly during
WW II.
Bob Sheldon: How long was your tour of
duty with 7th Fleet?
Joe Engel: By this time the Korean War was
on, and I was originally sent for a six-month
tour. I was not allowed to bring my family be-
cause it was not suitable to have them exposed
to danger. I went for six months, and I relieved
Ralph Beatty. He was there with his wife Doris
and his children, all of whom I knew very well
and whom I visited when I was ashore in their
vicinity. They lived in a suburb along the coast,
south of Tokyo.
I had a wonderful experience in the 7th
Fleet. All my experiences with the Navy when
I was in OEG were absolutely fabulous. It was
truly a challenge, but it was not insurmount-
able. We were able to do useful and important
work that hadn’t been done before. Frequently,
the foreign places we went to were sufficiently
different to be interesting—the people we dealt
with, the climate, the culture of the local region.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of projects did you
tackle for 7th Fleet?
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Joe Engel: One of the big projects in our over-
seas fleet activities was defending the fleet from
air attack. The fleet always maintained opera-
tional readiness when it was out, so if something
happened, they were trained up to it. They did
their best to remain ready-to-go.
They set up staged exercises in which a car-
rier task force would be placed somewhere at
sea, under some simulated combat situation,
in which they were going to be attacked by hos-
tile aircraft. The hostile aircraft would attack,
and we were in the combat information center
(CIC) watching the naval personnel do their
jobs. This consisted of placing all the various
ships in the right places and placing all the air-
craft that would go out to intercept an enemy
target before it got to the point where your com-
bat air patrol (CAP) might be working. CAP was
analogous to the destroyer escorts in the convoy.
You had to know about all these things, and
how they worked together. You might be wor-
ried about friendly and enemy submarines,
and transient merchant shipping going through
the waters that might be mistaken by the enemy
or by the task force for an enemy ship. We had
devised a standard exercise and had a code
name for it. We ran these things regularly.
We would go down to the CIC on the ship
that was being manned by the commander of
the task force. He and his staff had access to
the CIC where all the data pertaining to this op-
eration was gathered. It was collected by naval
personnel, probably clerks with a rating of yeo-
man. They knew how to listen to what was com-
ing in on the intercom, see what was to be seen
on the screens (e.g., targets coming in trying to
hit the carrier or other ships), keep track, and re-
cord the results. At certain stages of the game,
there were procedures for declaring a particular
target destroyed out of action, or a combat air pa-
trol aircraft out of action, or a destroyer out of ac-
tion. We set up procedures for recording this data
so that we could analyze it afterwards and fig-
ure out what had happened and make our anal-
ysis sufficiently cogent and relevant. We then
could make recommendations as to where cer-
tain changes would improve their performance.
Bob Sheldon: Do you remember any signifi-
cant findings?
Joe Engel: Usually we came up with results
that reported that the task force survived without
the carrier being hit. Sometimes there might be
a hit that resulted only in peripheral damage.
Various other aircraft or ships might have been
destroyed or disabled, and that’s usually what
happened.
I can only recall one occasion in which a
carrier was destroyed in an exercise. This was
a fascinating incident, because it did not take
place when I was in the 6th Fleet or 7th Fleet.
This happened in about 1953 when I had been
sent to Europe just after getting back from
Key West, before I settled down and became
a mine warfare team leader. We were in Wiesba-
den, Germany for three months conducting
a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
exercise known as Project Whiskey. Whiskey
was the code word for the letter W, which stood
for warfare.
We were not doing it with actual ships; we
were doing it by gaming. We had people play-
ing the role of the attacker and the role of the de-
fender. The exercise was being conducted by
these officers, all sitting in an office big enough
to hold something like 40 people. We had to be in
separate little units where no one could eaves-
drop on what the other one was doing. It was
a spacious place with good working conditions.
We kept all of the appropriate charts, very similar
to the ones that existed in the CIC of a carrier. To
do this, we had probabilities associated with the
various events that might take place. We turned
to the operations analysts who had been instru-
mental in helping to develop these in the first
place.
There were two of us from OEG there to
participate in the simulation of defense of a
NATO task force operating in the Mediterra-
nean. I loved the work. This was the first time
I’d ever been to Europe, and Wiesbaden was
a lovely place to spend some off-duty time.
While we were there, the other guy with me
was assigned to the actual naval unit, which
represented either the NATO force, or the US
naval air task force; I was attached to the um-
pires. When the activities impinged on the naval
air task force, I was the one who had to assess
the outcome. We did this by checking the tables
of probabilities, and then conducting a random
draw. If it came up right, from the point of view
of the task force, nothing happened to the
task force. But if it came up wrong, then they
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suffered whatever damage was being tested by
this device.
What it amounted to was craps shooting,
and I threw the dice. So whatever number comes
up determines what gets reported. If the number
is bad enough, you declare a casualty.
The first time this happened, I threw the
dice, and we blew the carrier out of the water.
(Laughter.) My colleague from OEG, who was
working with the task force itself, appealed
the decision of the umpire, because he wanted
the Navy to show up well. You have to consider
these things very seriously. You certainly don’t
want to destroy something on paper if the chan-
ces that it would be destroyed were very low. So
he appealed and the umpires accepted the ap-
peal. As a result, I was asked to throw the dice
a second time. This time, the dice came up with
a low number and the task force survived. Ev-
erybody, but me, was greatly relieved. I think
they might have learned something else. If the
carrier had been destroyed, they would have
had to do something then to prevent the enemy
strike force that was trying to come in to hit
Europe from the Mediterranean. It might have
been a very valuable exercise.
I’m not saying it was wrong to do this; I’m
saying it would have been different if we had
not run it a second time. But this is the kind of
thing that has to happen whenever you do train-
ing. If you really want to be realistic, you have to
allow for the possibility of the thing that you
don’t want to happen.
Wiesbaden was wonderful. As we strolled
down this boulevard, there was a cafe´ every 50
feet on both sides of the street for several blocks.
Every place had its own brand of beer, and they
had wonderful sandwiches at these outdoor
cafes. We settled on one particular cafe´ called
Blum’s which had a delicious beer and wonder-
ful sandwiches.
I also had the opportunity to take time off in
the middle of the trip. I went to Cologne, and
I took a trip on a Rhine riverboat. I saw the war-
time devastation of Cologne, which still had by
no means been repaired in 1953, only eight years
after the war had ended. It was a fascinating
trip, and I loved every minute of it.
Bob Sheldon: Getting back to 7th Fleet, since
you were there during the Korean War, were
any of your exercises affected by that?
Joe Engel: Definitely. While the war was go-
ing on, the mainland Chinese, the Communists,
were busy harassing Taiwan in hopes that they’d
scare the Taiwanese into capitulating. Chiang
Kai-shek was tough and hadn’t, as yet, thrown
in the towel. The mainland Chinese were threat-
ening to lob surface-to-surface missiles against
Taiwan. There were some Taiwanese who were
making their livelihood fishing from the Tachen
Islands, which were closer to the mainland than
Taiwan. These were Taiwanese civilians, and
their job was to take big fish vessels out, catch
a lot of fish, and bring them home to be used
by the people in Taiwan. The mainland Chinese
said they were going to occupy the Tachen Is-
lands. When they made that announcement,
the United States said, ‘‘Before you occupy those
islands, you better let those people get off, or
you’ll hear from us.’’ The mainland Chinese said,
‘‘We won’t do anything to jeopardize their lives.
We will allow them a peaceful evacuation. Nev-
ertheless, we’re going to do it.’’
So the 7th Fleet was ordered to steam to po-
sitions where we could observe what was going
on. We were in a high state of readiness, and if
fighting had broken out, we would have been
right in the middle of it. Fortunately, the Com-
munists allowed the evacuation to take place,
and that was the end of that particular close call.
We did lose one OEG man during the Ko-
rean War, back in the 7th Fleet. His name was
Irving ‘‘Spike’’ Shaknov. He was attached to
one of the air units during the Korean War. He
had become very close with some of the person-
nel that he was attached to, because he was sup-
posed to be observing what was going on in that
squadron. Somehow he was allowed to go on
a mission with a friend of his. They went up
on this mission, and neither the pilot nor Spike
ever came back.
Bob Sheldon: Spike was an analyst at OEG?
Joe Engel: Yes. There was a room in the head-
quarters of OEG (now the Center for Naval
Analyses, or CNA) named the Spike Shaknov
auditorium, in honor of Spike.
I went from the 7th Fleet to the 6th Fleet al-
most immediately afterward. While I was there,
the Suez Canal Crisis took place. The British and
the French together captured the Suez Canal. It
had been a secret operation that the US had not
been informed about in advance, and we made
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a lot of noise to our allies because we didn’t want
to see anything widespread coming about. We
urged the British and the French to give the Suez
Canal back to Egypt. The 6th Fleet was in a posi-
tion where we knew what was going on in real
time. We could observe what we felt we had to
observe, and if necessary, we would have been
in action. There I was, participating along with
all of the other folks, in the potential danger that
a war might break out.
Bob Sheldon: After 6th Fleet, where did you
go?
Joe Engel: I returned to the Washington area.
By this time, OEG was about to leave the Penta-
gon. We left about a year later, to our first offices
out of the Pentagon, which were in Rosslyn, Vir-
ginia. Soon after this period, I became a Deputy
Director in OEG, which meant that I was respon-
sible for one whole side of the office. We had the
air side, the surface side, and the subsurface side.
The fact is, this was a position that got passed
around. Some of the old timers who had served
during WW II were called on to function as dep-
uty directors. They didn’t really care for it, be-
cause like all good old warhorses, they want to
do what they know how to do; not tell somebody
else how to do it. Jay Steinhardt had the philoso-
phy that he didn’t want anybody telling the peo-
ple in our group what to do, unless they knew
how to do it themselves, and unless they had
real, meaningful field experience.
These guys had to do some administrative
work in addition to straight analysis and going
to the field. I felt pretty much the same way, but
I recognized that this was perfectly legitimate
and it meant that you were doing well in the or-
ganization. If I had to take a turn, I was willing
to do it. I became a Deputy Director when we
moved to Reston, and that changed the nature
of my responsibilities.
Bob Sheldon: How many people worked for
you?
Joe Engel: I had about three or four teams
working for me, and each team had about five,
so somewhere around 20 people. There were
a few secretaries who reported to us, including
the one that I had. We had access to the use
of our computer section; those were the days
of mainframes. You had to have professionals
who knew what they were doing to run it for
you.
At one time, we had to study computer
languages. I remember taking a six-week course
at OEG in computer programming using
FORTRAN. I never put it to use, but at least
I understood it well enough to discuss it with
the computer section. I recall having an opportu-
nity where I was required to make some compu-
tations, before I was a Deputy Director.
I had to calculate something to do with air
warfare, primarily air-to-air combat. When each
aircraft is shooting at the other one, you want to
get the element of surprise, and you want to be
able to fire as soon as you can, hopefully before
the other guy fires at you. You need to know the
physics of approach, of one moving target to an-
other, whether the moving target is evading or
not. The large part of OEG’s work was figuring
out detailed tactics, not strategy. Where do you
dunk the sonar? What angle do you come in on
when you see a target over there, so you can
make a turn which will put you in an advanta-
geous position? What if the wind is wrong and
you’re not exactly in the right spot?
During this period, I gave the computer sec-
tion this problem, and they computed isohodes.
An isohode is a line of equal penalty. The ‘‘iso’’
means equal, and the ‘‘hode’’ is the penalty.
Isohodes come into play when one aircraft is
trying to attack and destroy another one. The
idea is to find out the ideal maneuver, which
when you’re traveling in a certain definite direc-
tion, and you detect the enemy at a certain dis-
tance and bearing off of that track, you know
where the enemy aircraft is relative to you. You
know what speed he’s going and what track
he’s on. You’re both looking for each other. You
have to decide on a path that will get you to that
spot, with just one turn, and get in. That’s the
ideal intercept.
Bob Sheldon: Transitioning to MORS. In 1967
you were elected to the MORS Board of Direc-
tors. What was your involvement with MORS
before 1967?
Joe Engel: I had been active in various sec-
tions of ORSA. One of these was the Military
Applications Section (MAS, later called the Mil-
itary Applications Society) of ORSA. As a mem-
ber of MAS, I was keenly aware that we could
only discuss unclassified material. We could
not get the benefit of real cross-talk in MAS or
in the activities of ORSA as a whole. I was one
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of the people, who before MORS came into ex-
istence, lobbied for the establishment of such
a society, which would have access to classified
data and would allow colleagues who had ap-
propriate clearance, to discuss these things
with one another in a fairly open intellectual
forum. My early activities with MORS con-
sisted of trying to agitate and get people to
form such a society. It took about 10 years from
its first formal activity to the establishment of
the Society. That being the case, it made sense
that I was invited to serve on the Board in
1967. I cannot recall that I did anything notable
while I was on the Board, but I was very happy
to be there. I helped to find speakers and to fa-
cilitate the organization of a symposium, al-
though I never directed a symposium. I think
my best work on behalf of MORS was done be-
fore it got started.
I became an active participant in MORS
some years later, at which time I was further re-
moved from classified work, because I was no
longer working for OEG or CNA. For some years
after I had left those organizations, I continued to
work with NATO strictly as a volunteer. I was
a member of APOR, Advisory Panel on Opera-
tions Research, which was part of the Science
Committee of NATO. We ran some good interna-
tional meetings for all the NATO countries, and
we encouraged people to contribute papers of
suitable classification, and we frequently pub-
lished those results. That was doing, on an inter-
national level, a lot of the same kind of work that
MORS had been doing strictly within the United
States.
One of the things that I liked best about that
activity was an apprenticeship program whereby
young analysts from the less wealthy and estab-
lished OR countries in NATO could come to
some of the older, more well-established OR
countries. They could take internship and ap-
prenticeship and they could be hired by the or-
ganization for which they had interned, or they
could improve their careers professionally and
work elsewhere.
I inherited the post of chairman of APOR
two years after I had joined. I inherited this po-
sition from Bernard Koopman, who was the 6th
President of ORSA and had been one of my
mentors in OEG. He used to come in regularly
as an advisor and consultant to the group. He
recommended me to the panel as his successor.
He was my mentor, and I was delighted to have
the benefits of his advice.
Bob Sheldon: What about your involvement
in MAS in the early days?
Joe Engel: I was a bit more active in the MAS
than in MORS, because I didn’t want to stretch
myself too thin. I was heavily involved, for quite
a long period, in ORSA as well as doing my full-
time work, taking care of my family, traveling
around the world, and having a lot of fun in
other fields as well. Most of my professional ac-
tivities were within ORSA. I was always happy
to learn about what was going on in MORS, and
if there was something that I was able to do for
a short period, I would do so.
Bob Sheldon:When you went to the INFORMS/
ORSA meetings, did you sit on any nonmilitary
sessions?
Joe Engel: Yes, I did. My interests were rather
broad, both in subjects to which the methodol-
ogy of OR could be applied, as well as to the de-
tails of the actual methodology—i.e., the applied
and the pure forms of OR. Consequently, I was
interested in transportation. At a distance, I
learned something about the application of OR
to medicine, and I remember one early OR prac-
titioner named Ron Gue. Ron developed one of
the early prototypes for keeping efficient track
of what went on in a medical organization, like
a hospital or a clinic.
I was also very interested in standards
technology. I worked for a while as a consul-
tant to the Underwriters Laboratory based in
the Chicago area, which puts its stamp of ap-
proval on many industrial projects. One of
these was the Chicago Area Transit Study, or
CATS. There was one method called a gravity
model, which CATS had become very fond of,
and there was a big report that I had been
given to analyze. Based on that report, I con-
cluded that the methodology in the report
wasn’t very good, because you could get almost
any results you wanted out of that particular
model. It was a gravity model in the sense that
the amount of traffic between two points on the
network was proportional to the number of
users in the two areas—shades of Lanchester
Equations.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s get back to your experi-
ence in managing.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. JOSEPH H. ENGEL
Military Operations Research, V19 N2 2014 Page 81
Joe Engel: I started becoming a manager oc-
casionally, even before entering OR. My respon-
sibilities increased over time.
More specific to OR, I proceeded through
the ranks in my professional society by serving
on committees, and then becoming an officer of
ORSA, and moving up in the ranks. I served on
one or two minor committees, and then the
nominating committee. The following year I
became Secretary. I served three terms as Secre-
tary, was nominated for Vice President, and
then President.
In my job, I moved from being a very junior
analyst where I was sent on relatively unimpor-
tant short-term field assignments, to the respon-
sibility of observing what the Navy was doing
under operational or training conditions. I had
to observe the way they collected their data,
and made suggestions on how they should col-
lect their data, and what data they should col-
lect. OEG made great contributions not only to
the Navy, but to all of the Services.
OEG, starting during WW II and in the years
thereafter, set up standardized ways of collecting
data on exercises. One of the things that an OEG
representative did when he went to the field and
was assigned to one of the fleets was to analyze
these data. The OEG representative to a Fleet
had to be there when these exercises were con-
ducted. He had to be down in the CIC, the nerve
cell usually on board the carrier. He would ob-
serve everything that went on, and listen to the
radio circuits. Sometimes, something would be
played on a loud speaker so that everybody
could hear it. You would look at all the vertical
plots around the room and the radar screens
and the sonar screens. After this long (hours or
days) simulated battle in which data had been
carefully or carelessly collected, it was up to the
OEG rep to look over all this data, analyze it,
and make a report. He would give the report to
the 300 commanding officers, operations officers,
and logistics supply officers who had partici-
pated in the various subordinate units. He would
report on what he saw and what had happened
in this exercise. What went wrong and what
went right. That was quite a responsibility.
Bob Sheldon: Can you give an example of
what you reported?
Joe Engel: Generally speaking, what we
reported were the results of the battle. What
percentage of aircraft that the carrier was using
for its own defense were casualties? What was
the rate at which you destroyed enemy aircraft
that were trying to attack the carrier? What hap-
pened to other ships in the force? This was the
kind of data that we reported.
We also reported details that were perplex-
ing. I recall one incident during an air defense
exercise, when a bogey had been reported. Bo-
gey is slang for an enemy aircraft coming in. It
was being tracked by radars and was getting
about to where our CAPs were located.
We knew where these CAP were operating
and were tracking them. A strange anomaly de-
veloped in which it appeared that the aircraft
that was trying to attack the force started flying
in circles. We lost sight completely of where the
CAP intercept aircraft that had been vectored
towards the enemy aircraft was. Nobody knew
what had happened, because there were no re-
ports of damage by this CAP. When he had come
back, he had survived, and he had never seen the
enemy, and we had no reports on whether the en-
emy had ever seen this interceptor either. So we
couldn’t make heads or tails out of it.
I studied this and finally figured out what
happened. The CAP interceptor had strayed
off course by a few miles, perhaps because of
a stronger wind or wind from another direction.
Under those circumstances the CAP works with
what they’ve been briefed, unless there’s a ter-
rific weather change, because they don’t have
the ability to really do much precision naviga-
tion. Generally speaking, when you’re on a mis-
sion like that there are people watching you.
When it’s time for you to come home you call
up and say I’m coming home. They have means
by which they can give you a steer to get back to
where you want to land. That must be how he
got home at the end of the mission, but in the
meantime he was lost and this poor bogey was
supposedly going around in circles.
So this CAP aircraft had drifted off station,
and when the interceptor was closing the two
blips began to merge. Then when they sepa-
rated, perhaps one of them was lost, and the
people in the task force who were monitoring
this scene started to watch the blip that referred
to the interceptor rather than the bogey. They
were giving the interceptor vectors on how to
turn to catch the bogey. When they gave him
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those vectors he would turn and the people
back in the task force noticed the turn and they
thought it was the interceptor turning. (Laughter.)
So they gave the CAP another turn in the same
direction, so that they accelerated the whole spi-
ral operation that was taking place. That was
something that came out of very careful painstak-
ing analysis of the data we had. People accepted
this as being a legitimate explanation, and it gave
them something to watch out for in the future.
The same kind of things that happen in air
defense exercises also happen in surface war-
fare, and in submarine warfare.
Bob Sheldon: During your tenure as a man-
ager at OEG, who were your shining stars that
you mentored?
Joe Engel:There were lots of people and a few
of them rose to great heights within OEG, CNA,
and ORSA. I’ll mention some of the people whom
I thought were outstanding. Jay Steinhardt was
the first peacetime Director of what became
OEG; he started in 1945 and went to 1962. I
was Director of OEG after Jay and served from
1962 to 1967. I can’t really say that I mentored
the mathematicians because they had compa-
rable training to mine in mathematics. They
weren’t out in the field as much as I was, but
they could bring beautiful insights to bear on
problems that were presented to them. The out-
standing one in this capacity was Rufus Isaacs.
He did very fine work on dynamic program-
ming. Some of Rufus Isaacs’s insights were pro-
found. I was followed by Erwin Baumgarten.
Erwin was Director for two years and was fol-
lowed by Erv Kapos in 1969. Phil Depoy became
the Director some years after me, in 1974. He
stayed on as Director for 17 years.
Bob Sheldon: Any interesting events while
you were Director?
Joe Engel: I was visiting the 7th Fleet during
the Vietnam War. I was on a routine, once-a-year
swing around all our field assignments in the
operating areas, as well as the nonoperating
areas. We had people all over the world. I was
visiting the commander of Task Force 77, Admi-
ral John McCain, the father of Senator McCain.
When I came aboard, I was escorted down to
the CIC, where the Admiral was, because there
was an operation going on at the time. Since it
was not actually in a combat area, I was not vi-
olating any regulations by being there.
I introduced myself to the Admiral, and he
was standing at one of these admiral’s desks. He
had his headset on, covering one ear, so he could
talk to me and listen through the open ear, while
he was also listening on the radio circuit. This
mission was going on, and he was getting flight
reports. Meanwhile, he introduced himself, I in-
troduced myself. I told him my main job was to
see if he was satisfied with the way his OEG rep-
resentative was working. I also asked if there
were other things beyond the scope of our repre-
sentative and whether he wanted us to do some
work back in Washington. While we’re having
this conversation, he suddenly jumped to his
feet like a small boy and yelled, ‘‘Yippee!’’ I
looked at him with surprise, and he said, ‘‘I just
got news that our boys got back without any
casualties from our first strikes against Mu
Gia Pass.’’ Mu Gia Pass was a slope of a long,
extended valley between a north-south run-
ning range of mountains in the area which runs
down from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese were using that as a sup-
ply route to bring their logistics support and
troops from North Vietnam to where the front
lines were in South Vietnam. It was a very im-
portant target, and he was delighted that we
got this strike off, and that none of our boys
were hurt.
As a conscientious naval officer, he had ev-
ery right to be excited. I was pleased to be there
to observe how seriously the Admiral took his
job, and I was delighted we had men of his cal-
iber there.
Bob Sheldon: During your five years as head
of OEG, did you see any major trends in OEG?
Joe Engel: Yes. The first big trend was that
OEG was getting more heavily into logistics.
All of the work that they did was influenced
by logistics and influenced logistics. I recall col-
laborating with my boss, the Director, on some
fascinating work. Jay Steinhardt and I coau-
thored a paper on how you provide for resup-
ply, and I delivered that paper at a meeting in
Japan. On the one hand, you want to have the
supplies on the line on time, otherwise your
combat effectiveness suffers; on the other hand,
you don’t want the stuff to be lying around in
warehouses, where you’re spending money to
get them to the warehouse fast and to keep them
there under controlled conditions. You always
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have to strike a balance, and this is what logistics
management is all about. Our paper had to do
with ensuring the probability of supplies being
delivered when they were needed was high
enough to satisfy the user. We came up with pol-
icies which took this probability of timeliness as
a parameter, and we developed techniques to
make certain you would meet that.
Around this time, I was asked by Jay Stein-
hardt to head up a study group, and we were
convened to look into ways of keeping better
track of possibly hostile submarines or hostile
naval vessels. This was conducted at the Endicott
House in Dedham, Massachusetts, in the out-
skirts of Boston. It was a beautiful house and
had a fence around it, so it could be secured for
classified work. We came up with this Endicott
Report, looking at long wave sonar on the ocean
bottom.
There were other people who devoted them-
selves full time to this. Another trend was we
were being urgently requested by the Navy to
do much more on the financial side. We had been
concentrating on hardware and tactics for using
the hardware, and on the strategy for a large
campaign. We had the Naval Warfare Analysis
Group (NAVWAG), which did analysis of the ef-
fective cost of what was going on. The Navy
wanted more of that. The first head of NAVWAG
happened to be my first immediate supervisor in
OEG, Doug Brooks.
Bob Sheldon: Can you talk about OEG’s his-
tory and some of its difficulties in the transition
to CNA?
Joe Engel: The problems arose in 1960 and
1961. OEG was founded in 1945, so it had been
in existence about 16 years. During that entire
period, one contractor had the contract with
ONR to provide OR services to the office of
the CNO. That contract was with MIT, the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology. This made
good sense because Phil Morse was there. The
Office of Scientific Research and Development,
early in WW II, sent Phil Morse to England to
talk to the British about ‘‘operational research.’’
Then he came back and helped the Department
of the Navy and the Office of Scientific Research
and Development figure out what they should
do. Morse brought the philosophy of British op-
erational research back and the United States
decided to emulate it.
Morse was a prominent physicist. As a re-
sult of his leadership as the Director, OEG, the
Navy work that was done by the people he
hired worked very effectively for the Navy dur-
ing WW II.
It was logical after WW II to set up peace-
time OR groups for the Services, so we had the
OEG, the ORO, and OA for the Navy, Army,
and Air Force respectively. When these new
groups were set up, Phil Morse no longer
remained on board as Director, although he
continued to have an important influence in
OR. He returned to MIT where he served in fac-
ulty positions related to his first love, which
was physics.
He continued to be an influence in estab-
lishing ORSA, from which everything else we’re
talking about stems. He also met with people
from other countries, such as Sir Charles Good-
eve in England who had a position comparable
to his, and P.M.S. Blackett, also in England. They
held the first international meeting of Opera-
tional Research Societies and from that came
the International Federation of Operational Re-
search Societies (IFORS).
Morse did important work pertaining to the
Battle of the Atlantic, on the development of tac-
tics and strategy for the defense of convoys sail-
ing from South America and the Caribbean to
Europe. On the basis of that work and his profi-
ciency, he got medals; a few medals were given
out in all the Services to some of the civilians.
Morse was a good choice to serve as Direc-
tor, with excellent academic credentials and rel-
evant experience. He was admired, respected,
loved, hated, and feared (laughter) by various
people in his groups. I think that the ones who
both admired him most and recognized his
shortcomings most, were the more senior peo-
ple who had served with him during WW II,
as well as coming along with him into the civil-
ian peacetime operation.
When Phil Morse left OEG and went back to
MIT, his job went to Jay Steinhardt, who had
been in the wartime OR group.
OEG grew and prospered for many years
and was accepted very well by the Navy and
the other Services and by the Secretary of De-
fense as well, because we did good work. OEG
had been battle tested to begin with, and it grew
in a very logical way.
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Later, it turned out that the Navy wasn’t
quite satisfied with the way things were going
at OEG. An impasse was reached between the
trustees of MIT, who held the contract, and their
opposite numbers in the Office of Naval Re-
search (ONR), who were essentially the spokes-
men for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV).
They couldn’t come to a meeting of the
minds, so they decided to put out bids for a
new contract. Of course, MIT had the right to
bid on that new contract, but MIT did not win.
They decided to give it to another contractor,
the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia. This meant
bringing in a new Board of Trustees and bring-
ing in a new Chief Scientist, so that the Board
of Trustees could essentially run the superstruc-
ture and establish the administrative, to spend
our money wisely. This was around 1960 and
it took about two years to actually take place.
As a result Jay Steinhardt resigned; virtually
all of us in OEG thought that Jay Steinhardt had
been an excellent director. Before the new con-
tract was signed, Jay had recommended to
ONR and the new organization that I be named
the new Director of OEG and the new, larger
CNA. I moved from being the right-hand man
to Jay Steinhardt, and instead became his re-
placement as Director of the new OEG. I would
function during a transition period and hold
the troops together. I would see to it that we were
able to continue working well for the new man-
agement. The transition involved a mixture of
two emotions; one being pride and the other be-
ing fear. You’re proud if you do a good job and
can continue to do a good job; and you’re afraid
you’re going to get fired if you don’t do a good
job. This is the conflict that was taking place in
OEG.
During the first two years of my tenure as
Director, I had to supervise what was done
when ONR made its annual visit to OEG. Prior
to the change in management, it had been a
time-honored custom for approximately 19 years
that the representatives from ONR and from
MIT’s Board of Trustees would come to OEG
about once a year for an inspection tour of
OEG. Jay would line up a table, and he would
put around the edges of the table a copy of every
OEG study and every OEG report and every
CNO presentation that we made plus whatever
else he felt like laying around the table. Reports
were generally a compendium of studies dealing
with a related topic in various forms of progres-
sion, and the report would bring an entire field
and several years of work together and make
something very substantial out of it. Reports also
included the proceedings which we gave in per-
son to the Navy at these large presentations, for
which the transcripts had been published.
The representatives of ONR and the Board
of Trustees would walk around the table and
glance at these documents, and we would hold
a meeting that lasted one or two days. Various
people from OEG spoke on contemporary de-
velopments, and people from the Board of
Trustees or ONR spoke about their goals, and
then the members of the Board of Trustees met
and they decided whether they liked what they
had seen and heard. This had a lot to do with
whether or not the contract would be renewed.
For 19 years this had worked, and they had al-
ways renewed the contract, until 1962.
When I gave them this big, full table of high-
quality work, I was helping to maintain the
standards. We did this two years running.
I was only the Director of OEG for three
years, and then I got kicked upstairs; I became
the Assistant Chief Scientist of CNA.
Bob Sheldon: What was your role there?
Joe Engel: For a while I had a subtitle, I was
the Assistant Chief Scientist for Program Re-
view. That meant I made the final determination
on the validity of the works that we were pre-
paring to publish and submit to the Navy on be-
half of CNA. It was quite a responsible position,
and I had good experience by then. I had seen
just about all of the kinds of operations the Navy
performed, sometimes with hands-on familiar-
ity, of what was going on in the whole organiza-
tion. I liked writing professional material. I had
the theoretical background as well, so I was
a very good choice for that. But I didn’t have
any troops under me. When I was the Director
of OEG, I had something like 90 percent of the
personnel at CNA reporting to me.
Bob Sheldon: About how many people?
Joe Engel: I had somewhere around 250 full-
time analysts working for me; also others who
were support personnel, both secretarial and
technical. There were also our security person-
nel. We had a Director of Security responsible
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for maintenance of the security of all the classi-
fied material that we had in OEG. That meant
our secretaries would come in at the end of the
day, take every classified document off our
desks, and either put it away in files in locked
safes, or take it back to the main classified stacks
and see to it that security was maintained.
We had a computer section which consisted
of the early variety of nerds or geeks who spe-
cialize in working with computers. They were
the interface between the analysts and the com-
puter because they knew how to speak the
computer languages, and they could take our
mathematics or physics, and change it into a
program and put it into the computer and see
that it ran. In those days we were working strictly
on IBM main frames, a 360 and then a 365. They
were the equivalent of a palm pilot that we play
with these days.
Bob Sheldon: What were the projects you
worked on as Assistant Chief Scientist?
Joe Engel: I served for about a year as the As-
sistant Chief Scientist for Program Review, and
then became the Assistant Chief Scientist. I was
directly under the Chief Scientist. That meant
I had whatever assistant capabilities I could pro-
vide in the overall operations of the group. By
then a lot of people had left OEG, stripping it
back to primarily its field responsibilities and
only secondarily to analytic responsibilities. That
was a very important and demanding responsi-
bility.
Frank Bothwell was brought into CNA by
the new management as the new Chief Scientist
of our new organization. He came from a posi-
tion that he had in weapons development work-
ing for the Navy in California. A lot of our most
senior people knew of him by reputation and
respected him for his previous work. There were
either enthusiastic or terrible responses to this
man, but I didn’t have an opinion.
The directors of the other groups, which
were going to be part of CNA, were taken out
of OEG. We had a Marine Corps Operations
Analysis Group (MCOAG) formed out of our
OEG analysts who went to work with the Ma-
rines. We had a Technical Analysis Division
which became the Technical Analysis Group,
and was more concerned with questions of
hardware than specific warfare kinds of sys-
tems. We had another one, which was stationed
up at Cambridge, where they had been set up
because of their proximity to MIT.
Although CNA had been in existence a year
or two, we were operating pretty much the way
we had been, except under new management,
including a new Chief Scientist and the people
from the Franklin Institute who gave us our ba-
sic direction.
Bob Sheldon: How many people changed jobs
during the reorganization?
Joe Engel: The number of people who were
taken out of OEG or appointed from outside to
new managerial positions within the CNA was
quite small. I was working with the other groups
that had been set up, which didn’t have sufficient
personnel to do any real work. They could write
a few policy papers from time to time. They
could pass them to our upper management
and through Bothwell to the Board of Trustees.
Perhaps they would be given directly to people
with whom they had liaison in various parts of
the naval establishment. This was as diverse as
including MCOAG, a former division of OEG,
that dealt with Marine Corps problems. Russ
Coile was the first head of that group in the
new CNA and he was one of the wartime peo-
ple from OEG.
Another was NAVWAG, which Doug Brooks
now was the head of. We were both very con-
cerned that his group did not have enough
people to do any work, because he had his sec-
retary and his assistant and maybe one other
guy. When they had worked in OEG, he had
at least a dozen, maybe 20 people who were
on the scientific staff who were working for
him, plus access to the total support staff that
the whole group had. After the shuffle, he still
had that access, but he didn’t have anybody to
use it. This was also true of MCOAG and the
Systems Evaluation Group up at Cambridge,
which had a new man who had recently joined
OEG, just a year or two before.
I think we had four divisions in all: the Op-
erations Evaluation Division (OED), MCOAG,
NAVWAG, and the Economics Division. One
of the things I did was to separate OED into
two sections: the field section and the home of-
fice. There had not been, on paper at any rate,
a separation of these into two separate entities.
It struck me, at the time, to make good sense
to have two separate entities that could talk to
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one another properly. That helped the Director
of OEG decide who was going on the next field
assignment and what would happen to that guy
when he finished the field assignment and came
back to the home group.
The CNA reorganization wasn’t as effective
as the Navy had hoped. After five years, in about
1967, the Navy took the contract away from the
Franklin Institute and gave it to the University
of Rochester, and then later they moved it to
the Hudson Institute. I left CNA in 1967.
Bob Sheldon: When you left CNA, where did
you go?
Joe Engel: I went to COMSAT (Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation) after being with
CNA. I moved to COMSAT with a little help
from my friends (laughing) to a position where
I could work on something positive, like help-
ing the far-flung corners of the earth to commu-
nicate with one another. What could be better
than that?
Bob Sheldon: Did any of your friends leave
OEG about the same time you left?
Joe Engel:Yes. A good friend of mine, Howard
Kreiner, who I relieved in Key West, later fol-
lowed me to COMSAT.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of job did you go to
at COMSAT?
Joe Engel: I got a position as a special adviser
to Lucius Battle. Battle had served in the State
Department and was Vice President of COM-
SAT. I had met him once, quite by chance, long
before this COMSAT business, in the Mediter-
ranean when I was serving with the 6th Fleet
and he was there as a governmental envoy.
He had been the Ambassador for the United
States to the United Arab Republic (Egypt).
We had some pleasant conversations and he
may have remembered those. They had an ac-
tive COMSAT laboratory, but my efforts were
to work for the upper staff management. Lucius
Battle was my immediate boss, and I was sup-
posed to do OR studies pertaining to the overall
operations of COMSAT, not specifically to the
scientific endeavors that were the province of
the laboratory.
COMSAT was an organization that was de-
veloping equipment, hardware and software. It
would then persuade members of the interna-
tional community to acquire and use this equip-
ment to set up a network of communication
satellites that would enable communications to
be sent all around the world.
Bob Sheldon: Were you involved in ORSA
while you were at COMSAT?
Joe Engel: Yes. I was still a member of the
ORSA community. I became the 17th President
of ORSA in 1968.
Bob Sheldon: You mentioned offline that you
testified before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee. Can you give us the story behind that?
Joe Engel: In the late 1960s, various weapon
systems for use by the military were under con-
sideration, for budgetary purposes, to deter-
mine whether they should be procured and
whether research should be done on them. The
federal government has to approve the budgets;
the budgets are created by Congress and signed
by the President. It’s necessary for all these peo-
ple to be well informed on the matters under
discussion.
They were looking into the potential of
a weapon system called Safeguard. I was called
to testify because I had been, along with other
well-known and experienced people in the OR
community, asked to prepare a report on the
manner in which two other people had testified
on this same weapon system.
One of the people was Albert Wohlstetter,
who was based in Chicago. The other was
George Rathjens. He was the Chief Scientist
of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
(WSEG) in the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA), which supported the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It was certainly appropriate that IDA be
considered as a source of information.
It was logical for Rathjens to testify on this
subject; and it was logical to have Wohlstetter,
because he was definitely involved profession-
ally working on the development of the Safe-
guard system, and he was a proponent of this
system. They both testified.
Bob Sheldon: What was Safeguard?
Joe Engel: Safeguard was an antiballistic
missile system to protect US ICBM sites. It also
had a guidance system and it had a certain
range and this combination of characteristics
warranted consideration by the military, be-
cause it could do something that they had not
been able to do before. It represented an im-
provement and something that they ought to
have if they could get it at an economical price.
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When these two guys testified, they differed
in their statements about the potential of this
equipment and its costs. There were very strong
differences between them. This had the Senate
confused, and they needed to get some objec-
tive means of evaluating these two conflicting
statements so that they could reach their own
conclusions.
What had preceded my testimony was the
fact that Wohlstetter wrote a letter to ORSA
complaining that he felt that the testimony
that Rathjens offered to the Senate was biased
and wrong, and that he was guilty of distort-
ing the facts. Rathjens rebutted by saying that,
on the contrary, he felt that because Wohlstet-
ter was personally involved in the develop-
ment of the Safeguard, that he had left the
realm of ‘‘proper OR,’’ which is to make rec-
ommendations to a client. He had instead be-
come an advocate, which you’re really not
supposed to do when you are providing objec-
tive analysis.
Once you become an advocate, you become
someone who supports the position that you
have put forward for the client. And you can
support a position without lying by not men-
tioning certain things. This is why when you’re
in court and they ask a witness to tell the truth,
thewhole truth and nothing but the truth; they are
seeking truly objective information. Whereas, if
you don’t necessarily tell the whole truth you
may be omitting certain facts about the subject,
that do not support the position you are advocat-
ing. This is why saying ‘‘the whole truth’’ is so
important and this is why it is conceivable that
Wohlstetter’s statements could have been biased
in this manner even though he may not actually
have been lying, but he was shading the results
by omission.
I’m not accusing him of this; I’m saying it is
a possibility that could apply to any individual.
The same thing might be said of Rathjens, be-
cause he was advocating a position strongly in
opposition to what Wohlstetter was saying. He
might not have been lying; he might have been
merely omitting certain things or emphasizing
certain things that Wohlstetter did not choose
to emphasize. It was a question of the conflict
between advocacy and objectivity which was
brought into focus as something that ORSA
should look at, and we did.
I was a Past President of ORSA at the time,
and I was one of about five Past Presidents and
a couple of other guys who were invited to look
into this matter and report to the society.
Bob Sheldon: Who were the other guys?
Joe Engel: Hugh Miser was one of them and
there were two or three other Past Presidents of
ORSA and a couple of other people.
We completed our report and called it
‘‘Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Re-
search.’’ It was published as a special edition
of Operations Research, the journal of the Oper-
ations Research Society of America (Operations
Research, Vol. 19, No. 5, Sep, 1971, pp. 1246–
1258). In addition to analyzing the testimony
of both the people involved and offering our
opinion on whether it was good testimony or
not, we also wrote what amounted to a moral
code for how to perform honest consultation
for your client. This was a potentially valuable
contribution. At the time, the President of
ORSA was Bob Machol, and he wrote a pro-
logue to the report saying that it should be
regarded very seriously by all members of the
OR community as a guideline to how OR
should be done. This made it a very emotional
issue for a lot of people, scientists in or out of the
OR community, because essentially it was sug-
gesting there’s a certain way a scientist should
behave.
Bob Sheldon: Were your opinions unani-
mous, you and the other guys?
Joe Engel: Yes, they were. We had consider-
able discussion, but we reached unanimity and
a report was written which we all voted to ac-
cept. While we were taking testimony and evalu-
ating, we spoke to both Rathjens and Wohlstetter
and we read their writings. We formed our con-
clusions about what they had written and said,
as well as our conclusions as to the validity of this
work.
We were making an independent examina-
tion and we tried to be objective. We reported
flaws on both sides to make it quite clear that
we were not trying to choose sides, but we were
trying to point to errors in process.
We produced this document as an official
publication of ORSA, which bore the endorse-
ment of the society, and this was obvious because
the prologue agreed with the positions that we
had taken. It was interesting to see who lined
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up on the sides of this controversy that was
stirred up by this report.
Bob Sheldon: Do you mean in the Senate or in
the OR community?
Joe Engel: In the OR community. The people
who were high up in the faculty or former asso-
ciates of MIT were strongly opposed to the re-
port. Aside from the philosophical reasons,
scientists should not be hampered in the accom-
plishment of their research by any consider-
ations outside the research itself. The reason
that people at MIT may have been influenced
by that is George Rathjens had been affiliated
with MIT and he was one of their favored sons.
Other people at MIT were involved in the devel-
opment of OR, including Phil Morse, who was
the founder of ORSA. My ex-boss, Jay Stein-
hardt, was also an MIT affiliate and had been
an employee of MIT and was heavily involved.
There was a commitment of these affiliates of
MIT who opposed this report because it was,
by implication, critical of things that MIT had
supported.
I was personally attacked, as were other
members who participated in writing this re-
port, by people who opposed the position that
ORSA had taken as voiced by the authors of this
report.
Bob Sheldon:How was it received by the Sen-
ate when you testified?
Joe Engel: They had access to the report and
could have read it and maybe they did. Then I
testified. What I gave was an encapsulated sum-
mary of the report in which we questioned the
objectivity of both Rathjens and Wohlstetter.
We pointed to errors that we found in the re-
corded testimony and publications of these two
gentlemen on issues pertaining to this particular
weapon system.
What this did to the Senate was show them
that they were looking at a bucket of worms,
and it was up to them to decide how to pick
the spaghetti out from the worms. We helped
them by clarifying the distinctions between the
worms and the spaghetti. It was up to them to
do that because they were the ones who had to
make the decision.
We tried to be objective. One of the points of
our entire report was when you make a recom-
mendation to a client, you should give him your
conclusions about the good and bad points, so
that he can then draw conclusions. He will then
have all the information that you can put at his
command, including information that may not
necessarily support the recommendation that
you’re making.
Not only do you put in your conclusions
and recommendations, but you give a complete
summary of all of the things that you looked at
and learned and what the limitations were. And
then he can accept or reject your conclusions, in
whole or in part. That was the gist of our report.
And frankly I don’t think that is offensive, ex-
cept perhaps to some individuals who feel that
questioning their results is a slur.
Bob Sheldon: This list of ethical guidelines,
has that stayed current in the INFORMS com-
munity? Do people still use such guidelines?
Joe Engel: I don’t know that it was ever reis-
sued by ORSA. It may be that it’s a dead issue in
the sense that people say, ‘‘That’s right, but we
know how to do that.’’
Bob Sheldon: Let’s transition now to acade-
mia. What motivated you to go to academia?
Joe Engel: I was recruited.
Bob Sheldon: Did one of your ORSA friends
recruit you?
Joe Engel: Yes. Bob Machol had been work-
ing on me since before I went to COMSAT. Bob
followed me as President of ORSA in 1971,
and he had been at OEG. Bob was the editor
of all the publications that ORSA produced.
That was a very important and responsible
position, because you had to know how to be
an editor, as well as to understand the subject
matter.
Bob and I got to be good friends during that
early period at OEG, both personal and profes-
sional. He left a couple of years after I got to
OEG and went to the University of Michigan
to do graduate work. He finished his disserta-
tion and wrote a book, the first textbook on sys-
tems engineering.
Bob Sheldon: He was in Chicago when he
recruited you?
Joe Engel: He had gone to the University of
Illinois at Chicago Circle, which was in Chicago.
When they set up the University of Illinois at
Chicago Circle, they bought the land and put
up new buildings.
Bob Sheldon: The University of Chicago had
a good reputation for math.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. JOSEPH H. ENGEL
Military Operations Research, V19 N2 2014 Page 89
Joe Engel: Yes, they had a very fine math de-
partment. Bob Machol was one of the people
they recruited as the Chairman of the Systems
Engineering Department in the College of Engi-
neering. They also set up a Department of Man-
agement Science in the economic side of the
college.
I went there as the chairman of the depart-
ment, at Bob’s urging. Later, he went to North-
western University, where he served on their
OR faculty. But at the time that he approached
me after I had had this experience at COMSAT,
I had already decided that I was going to leave.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have administrative
duties and teach classes?
Joe Engel: Yes, I did. I had the full panoply of
responsibilities. When I accepted the position,
I was retained as a full professor with tenure
and as a department head. I was expected to
teach and conduct research and go out and get
grants and administer my department and par-
ticipate in committees to facilitate what was go-
ing on in the university as a whole.
Bob Sheldon: How many professors were in
your department?
Joe Engel: I had three instructors, three assis-
tant professors, and two associate professors. It
was a small department, but it ran an adequate
program of undergraduate studies at the time
that I arrived.
Within two years, I proposed and developed
a program of graduate studies, which was ac-
cepted by the college and enabled us to institute
graduate education and authorized the granting
of the master’s degree. Later, this was extended
to the doctorate, although not in my time. I had
the privilege of being the first dissertation advi-
sor of someone taking the master’s degree. I also
conducted graduate courses, as well as previ-
ously having conducted undergraduate courses.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of courses did you
teach?
Joe Engel: One was a seminar that was de-
vised as a laboratory course for the graduate stu-
dents. In that seminar, the graduate students had
to conduct experiments and collect data and an-
alyze the data that pertained to systems engi-
neering. It was a popular course and lots of
good students took it.
I told one of the university administrators
about some of the results that the students had.
One of the results was that he had understated
the cost of excavation of the foundations for
the university’s buildings and these costs were
substantial. That was fun, and I enjoyed it very
much.
Bob Sheldon: Was it while you were at Chi-
cago that you co-founded Omega Rho?
Joe Engel: We started before that. For some
time, there was discussion in the OR commu-
nity that the more established sciences had honor
societies. This was a means of recognizing the
quality of work that students were performing
in these fields and giving them recognition, and
promoting their careers and thereby doing better
work for the community at large.
One of the proponents of this was Clinton
Ancker, well known in the OR community. He
asked if I would like to work with him to estab-
lish an honor society. I liked the idea and ac-
cepted. I then became involved in all the
minutiae that you have to go through when
you set up a new organization.
We wanted to follow the guidelines of the
Association of College Honor Societies, and
Clint knew about this because he had more ex-
perience in academia. Clint did most of that
work. I got the tasks of setting up this organiza-
tion. That involved the details of how this orga-
nization should be accepted. We would have to
make our wishes known to the various universi-
ties that would wish to have such an honor soci-
ety on their campus. Wouldn’t you like to be one
of the universities that has a chapter like this on
your campus, and if you hurry up right now,
you can be a founding chapter. We had to know
how to set up chapters. We had to write a con-
stitution for the overall organization and the
methods of control of it and whether it would
have a board.
A lot of the details were hammered out by
the two of us. I suspect Clint had the major
brunt, while I concentrated on the details.
It was important to develop a name, the sym-
bols that would epitomize the society. Like Pi Tau
Sigma and Tau Beta Pi and Phi Kappa Phi and
other honor societies that had Greek letters. I
had to choose Greek letters that would be appro-
priate, and I did the logical thing. I approached
the Greeks who ran the Greek OR society in the
international community to get their advice on
how we might name this new honor society.
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They told me that the Greek words for OR
were very long and complicated compared with
English. Operations is three syllables. Research
is two syllables. The Greek words had more syl-
lables and they might have been harder to pro-
nounce for people who didn’t already speak
Greek. And they had different initials than the
English words for OR. They recommended that
what we ought to do, because it would be easily
recognized by the international community,
was to use the letters Omega and Rho, which
are the Greek letters for O and R. Omega and
Rho became the initials of our society and the
name of it.
Bob Sheldon: Did you get help from the
ORSA community?
Joe Engel: Yes. We were encouraged by the
ORSA community to approach various organi-
zations, and when we needed information they
gave it to us. Not only did I devise the initials,
and consequently the name of the organization,
I helped to set up the idea that we needed some-
one to act as a director of operations who would
run the thing on a daily basis.
We wrote a constitution, which called for
election of the officers of the society. When
Omega Rho was incorporated and had a few
charter chapters, the first election was held,
and Clinton Ancker was the first President.
He was the principal founder and he deserved
it. He ran unopposed. I was nominated and
elected as the first Vice President. Then I got
elected as the next President. More universities
asked for chapters on their campuses and we
were happy to see to it that they were accepted.
There were procedures for accepting or reject-
ing an application.
Bob Sheldon: You left academia and chose to
go to the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA). Why there?
Joe Engel: A friend of mine, Don Maylo, was
director of the division in NHTSA that was re-
sponsible for statistical analysis concerning
safety. Don was an ex-OEG member. I had been
his senior because I arrived earlier and was his
first project team leader. We had many contacts
over the years, and he decided to leave NHSTA
about the time that I decided to leave academia.
He was looking around for a successor, because
he was planning to leave the OR field and be-
come a lawyer. Eventually he became a good
lawyer. He told me what the job was and urged
me to apply for it.
I applied for that position and received an
offer from NHTSA, so I took the job. My super-
visor was Bill Scott. They had three divisions in
this part of the NHSTA. My division analyzed
statistics concerning accidents, fatalities, casual-
ties in various kinds of traffic situations, and
whether they were head on, a side swipe, around
a curve, crossing a railroad crossing or at an in-
tersection, or speeding. These were the various
kinds of parameters on the road that could influ-
ence how safe you were at the time. Safety had to
be measured in terms of the number of accidents
per something which is a measure of exposure to
that condition. The usual measure of exposure
was passenger miles. You would learn how
many accidents or fatalities or injuries or just
plain accidents occurred per thousands of pas-
senger miles.
The numerators were a count of how many
incidents occurred during a standard number
of passenger miles. Another way was, instead
of using passenger miles, use just plain miles,
which would be the case for safety or vulnera-
bility of the vehicle to accidents. Vulnerability
might be affected by the number and age of
the passengers. I found the work interesting
and traveled around the country to talk to peo-
ple involved in safety, and then I returned to the
office and made these calculations and gave re-
ports. I was briefed on assignments from Bill
Scott on what type of safety they were con-
cerned with, and we would go do it.
Bob Sheldon: How many people worked for
you?
Joe Engel: About a half dozen. Some of the
people were quite competent, because they had
been there about five or 10 years. They were
about my age and I enjoyed working with them.
It was a good intellectual climate and the work
was very important.
Bob Sheldon: How did you deal with the
fuzzy data, for instance the miles?
Joe Engel: This is precisely the problem that
troubled me. It turned out that the best way to
estimate exposure or miles or the number of cars
that crossed a given point per day, was to go out
into the field and count what you were inter-
ested in. One of the automatic devices didn’t re-
quire manpower on the site for days at a time
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was a little rubber cable that stretched across the
road, and every time a set of wheels went over
it, it would make a jagged interruption in
a smooth line that occurred when it was empty.
You could tell from the recording whether the
vehicle was a motorcycle or a four-wheel pas-
senger car or a small truck or an 18 wheeler, be-
cause you could count the number of peaks on
the right and the left side of the wheels. You
would know what time it was, so you could
get the influence of night and you could dis-
cover what was happening in rainy weather,
sunny weather, or cloudy weather by relaying
the weather conditions.
You would learn also when the rush hours
were and the rate in equilibrium, or at night
when there was practically nobody on the road.
Incidents were simpler to count, because you
would look at police or insurance records and
get hard information.
In spite of the fact that the pressure cable
was less expensive than manpower, it was ex-
pensive because you had to have the equip-
ment, you had to maintain it, you had to
collect the tapes that were produced and then
analyze it. But in the very early 1980s, federal
money was tight and when there was a budget
cut, part of that cut went to my division and I
didn’t have enough money to make the mea-
surements that I needed. That was the main rea-
son I decided I didn’t want to stay there,
because I was hit too hard by the budget. Sooner
or later the quality of the work we put out
would suffer.
Bob Sheldon: Do you recall any dramatic is-
sues during your time there?
Joe Engel: We were interested in the impact
of improved safety features on the vehicles.
There were lots of things done over the years,
and the controversies at that time related pri-
marily to the introduction of airbags. Safety
belts were already in use at the time. There were
different varieties, and one could quibble about
which kind of seatbelt was better—whether you
anchor them to the floor or to the side frame or
the ceiling. There were similar controversies
about the airbag. The technology for producing
both seatbelts and airbags had been around for
quite some time by the 1980s and the system
had matured to the point where the car makers
were putting seatbelts in all of the cars.
We were now going through this kind of de-
bate with car makers concerning airbags. They
didn’t want to install airbags on all of their vehi-
cles initially, and we preferred not to pass a fed-
eral law requiring them to install airbags. There
was a carrot-and-stick game going on, where
you would offer carrots to them if they did these
things voluntarily, and you would threaten
them with the stick of making it compulsorily.
That was a history of the way new safety fea-
tures developed as technology improved. After
some resistance, the car makers would install
those things, and then sometime later it would
be compulsory at the federal level.
The administrator of NHTSA at that time
was Joan Claybrook. She had been a long-time
prote´ge´ of Ralph Nader. They both were inter-
ested in the consumer, quality of life, and the en-
vironment. She was sincerely interested in the
consumer welfare, which is what you really
need in an agency concerned with traffic safety.
After a couple of years at this, I found that
because I could not measure the data I needed
for calculating safety, it was meaningless. I called
the Bureau of Standards—they had also wanted
to hire me when I left Chicago—and I was hired.
Bob Sheldon: What year did you go to work
for the Bureau of Standards?
Joe Engel: About 1982. I stayed with them
and retired from the civil service in 1986, when
I was 68 years old.
My contact at the Bureau of Standards was
Burton Colvin. He had been a supervisor of
teaching assistants when I did my graduate
work at the University of Wisconsin. I taught
calculus, and Colvin was my supervisor. Colvin
knew that I had been a good teaching assistant
and he knew from my record that I was well
qualified. I applied to him and got the position.
I started out with a very positive attitude and
had a very competent staff.
Alan Goldman, whom I had relieved at the
Bureau of Standards, had this huge stack of doc-
uments roughly three feet high on his table; they
were unclassified so he wasn’t breaking any
rules, but sloppy as all get out. Someone would
come in and ask for some document and Alan
would just reach into the pile, pull out the doc-
ument, and hand it to him; it was amazing.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of projects did you
work on at the Bureau of Standards?
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Joe Engel: Some of them were highly theoret-
ical. They were continuations of research by peo-
ple that were still there. There was research on
fire safety and building construction. There was
some work on crystals recently discovered that
were not symmetric. Someone was working on
tiling. Tiling is a method of filling a plane with
a simple polyhedral. At that time, most of the
emphasis was on crystal shapes that were sym-
metric, such as a diamond, equilateral triangle,
rectangle, or square.
You can get checkerboards with staggered
rectangles of various ratios of length to width
and that’s fairly straightforward, but when un-
symmetrical crystals were discovered, the ques-
tion of tiling those things came up.
This one man made fantastic strides and
discovered how to do unsymmetrical tiles. He
worked primarily with triangles that were not
isosceles or equilateral. The isosceles and equi-
lateral, being symmetric, were easy. You can
construct diamonds by putting together two
isosceles triangles, and the word for a diamond
is a rhombus; it’s an equilateral parallelogram.
With other triangles that were not symmetric,
you could drop an altitude from the vertex op-
posite the longest side of the triangle and then
you could make ratios of the altitude and the
long segment of the hypotenuse.
Certain of those ratios would allow you to
make a fit that would relate those triangles
to something that you could replicate in a
space-filling manner. Once you have a rectan-
gle, you can fill space in all kinds of ways and
get interesting patterns on a countertop. This
has been done, and you can eliminate the
rectangles if you wanted to do it solely with
triangles.
As a division chief, when I walked in, they
gave me an IBM desktop to keep track of my
budget, performance ratings, and other admin-
istrative responsibilities, including report writ-
ing. I started out knowing absolutely nothing,
except a theory of how to use a desktop com-
puter and it proved to be just about as easy as
that. Prior to that time, I didn’t work much
with computers. I prepared material for a spe-
cialist who worked with computers. Desktop
computers came out in about 1978, and they
had become prevalent by 1980 when I first
started working for the civil service.
I had a word processor and spreadsheets. I
learned how to calculate various mathematical
functions of data with spreadsheets. I could
write my own reports and do my own research.
A lot of what I had to do on the computer was
material that in older times would have been
turned over to a secretary or a computer section.
At the end of the second year and near the
end of the fourth year, we had to undergo RIFs
(reductions in force) because federal funds
for the Bureau of Standards were cut. The RIFs
were very disruptive. You were forced to RIF
enough people to recover the salaries that
amounted to the money being cut for personnel
from your unit. That meant essentially that I
was firing people. The first RIF was compara-
tively minor. I had to RIF two or three people
from my division.
The second RIF was much more serious. Big
cuts were made all over the place. The OR divi-
sion in its entirety was RIF’d. That meant that I
had to write the papers and inform the people
that every one of them was RIF’d, and I was in-
formed that I was among the people being
RIF’d. I could remain at the Bureau, but not as
a division chief. I would have to take a cut in
grade. I was at that time in the Senior Executive
Service. I was told that I could take on a GS-15
rating, and I would retain my salary for the next
two years, but after that I would revert to the
normal salary for a GS-15. I decided under those
circumstances that I would retire. I announced
that decision after I found someplace else to go.
I went to Arthur D. Little, a global manage-
ment consulting company. My friend there was
Dave Boodman. He had arrived at OEG a year
before I did, but he was about my age and had
very similar experiences to mine. He was active
in ORSA, and we were good friends. I called
up Dave and filled out the application. About
two weeks later, I received a phone call from
the Washington office of Arthur D. Little and
was interviewed and was made an offer and
accepted.
I worked for Arthur D. Little for four years.
I worked as a consultant rather than an em-
ployee, but I got a good salary, a little higher
than what I had been making as a civil servant.
Arthur D. Little had several contracts dealing
with the Postal Service, but the project on which
I was consulting was the cream of the projects.
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It involved developing a real-time com-
puter system for the Postal Service that would
enter all of their operations and enlist all of their
facilities, their trucks, airplanes, and trains, and
the schedules when they sent things. The sys-
tem included the entire operational status of
the things they did, and the relationship of the
equipment and the customer demand to the ef-
ficiency with which they accomplished their op-
erations. You could talk about the percentage of
mail that didn’t get delivered in accordance with
the performance standards for that class of mail.
We also had to compute the procurement costs of
the facilities and equipment, as well as the oper-
ating costs and scheduling information.
I said you have to include maintenance.
I was given the responsibility for what I felt
was part of the project on which, up until then,
nothing had been done.
Bob Sheldon: Did you get it done in four
years?
Joe Engel: Yes, I did. The group, before I got
there, did essentially the dog work. They devel-
oped the work required to record, store, and dis-
play the actual geography of the mailing system:
big maps with the time zones shown on them; lo-
cations of facilities and airports; and road maps.
They were able to take into account schedules of
the airlines and trains, and the speeds of the
trucks on the road.
They were also able to keep track of these
things going from the first unit to the zip code
collection facility, then from the zip code to the
region, from that region to the next region, back
down to the zip code, and finally to the individ-
ual unit. But they didn’t have any of the mainte-
nance effects in it.
With them providing the foundation, I fig-
ured out what would happen if maintenance
were perfect. I then added what would happen
if maintenance was not perfect—if you had
breakdowns, or flat tires, or a train derailed.
Comparing to perfect maintenance, you could
get results of nonperformance if schedules were
not met. When they were ready to install that
equipment shortly thereafter, I looked over my
data from test runs, and I compiled a report.
My report stated that there was one partic-
ular class of mail that would not meet perfor-
mance standards, and that was air mail. I said
half of the air mail won’t get there on time
because of the airline scheduling and the facil-
ity scheduling that had to blend with it. I made
that prediction on the basis of the model that
we had derived, and the next month my pre-
diction was borne out by operational data.
We had known that we were having trouble
with air mail, but here was a theoretical deriva-
tion from analysis of what they had. It verified
what had been essentially old wives’ tales—
there had not really been a truly systematic col-
lection of this data. I was able to tell them that
this problem was an inevitable result of the com-
bined conflicts of schedule, and that meant that
something had to be changed if you wanted to
improve performance. Following that, the Postal
Service made attempts to modify scheduling so
they could improve their air mail performance.
I then went to work on the maintenance
model. We had a very simple maintenance
model. Under a periodic maintenance regime,
there are standard equations that tell you the
frequency of occurrence. It enables you to fig-
ure out what fraction will be delayed during a
period of downtime. I had this fully developed
and ready to go after I had been there four years.
Then we suddenly received notice at Arthur D.
Little that the liaison officer we dealt with, who
was responsible for the OR efforts of the entire
Postal Service, was out of funds.
He discontinued the contract on a very
short notice, so at the end of the period at which
this was done, Arthur D. Little would no longer
be working for the Postal Service. That meant
that the entire Washington office had to be
closed. As a consultant, I had no seniority rights
and they released all of the consultants.
I had retired from the civil service in 1986,
but I effectively retired in 1990. I had started
working when I was 21, and now I was in my
early 70s. I had a long career by that time, so I be-
gan collecting my retirement pensions, which
were good enough for me to live comfortably
on at the time.
Bob Sheldon: I assume you continued your
involvement in the OR community?
Joe Engel: I did a little more paid consulting
in the next couple of years. Somebody who was
writing an encyclopedia of OR asked me to work
on specific topics that eventually appeared in that
encyclopedia. I continued for some time to main-
tain an active interest in OR, and I continued to
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attend INFORMS meetings and occasionally do
something on behalf of the society on request,
as well as some committee work.
I participated in meetings that suggested
a merger of TIMS (The Institute of Management
Sciences) with ORSA, from which INFORMS
was started. TIMS had been an offshoot of
ORSA. I was always against the split and I
was one of the strong advocates for its reunifica-
tion. I served on a committee and we came up
with that recommendation, and that recommen-
dation was implemented almost immediately.
By the time INFORMS was started, there was
recognition in both societies that they had ap-
proximately a two-thirds overlap of member-
ship; it was inefficient, and the societies were
not getting enough money.
The early ORSA was dominated by the mil-
itary side of things, and the commercial aspects
of OR were beginning to grow. This is OR, only
they call it management science, just to show
that they were different, and it didn’t have mil-
itary overtones. That’s why TIMS was formed in
the first place, because the nonmilitary people
who had become involved didn’t have enough
of a voice in ORSA. This is attested to by the fact
that Phil Morse was the first President of ORSA
and Jay Steinhardt was the third President of
ORSA.
Bob Sheldon: MAS created an award in his
name, the Jay Steinhardt Prize.
Joe Engel: Yes. Jay died a few years after he
left OEG. He had taken a position as Scientific
Advisor to the President of Georgetown Univer-
sity. It was a respected position, and he was well
thought of. He was also a scientist in his own
right, one of the early biomedical engineers.
He used to go to Woods Hole, Massachusetts,
every summer and work on his biomedical re-
search. He was trying to deconstruct and recon-
struct the human hemoglobin molecule. This
was long before the time when our knowledge
of DNA was what it later became. I was well
known to the family because I had been Jay’s
right-hand man, and I was his good friend after
he left OEG.
They asked me to conduct a memorial
service for him in the chapel at Georgetown
University. After that service was over, I met
privately with the family at their request and they
asked me what could be done to memorialize
Jay’s name. I suggested that they set up a
medal to be awarded to the person who best
embodied the concept of a fruitful career in
military OR.
ORSA acted on that suggestion and went to
MAS. I wasn’t active in MAS at the time, al-
though I had been in the past. I was surprised
and embarrassed when it turned out that the
first recipient of this particular award was me.
(Laughter.) I had no idea that this was coming,
and to an outsider it might have looked as if I
was feathering my own nest in the sense that
I recommended an award that would be given
to me, which was not what I had in mind. I
had in mind some of the more senior people,
for example, Bernard Koopman. I wasn’t restrict-
ing it to just OEG; I meant it for all the Services.
There were plenty of people who could have
been given this medal. Nevertheless, I think it
was a good award in principal and I’m pleased
that I did get the award.
Getting back to the leadership of ORSA, the
first 16 ORSA presidents were all from the mil-
itary. I was the 17th President of ORSA, and
by the time we celebrated our 20th anniversary
of ORSA in New Orleans, I was no longer even
the junior President. We had a wonderful time
at that 20th anniversary of ORSA. We were told
in advance that we were going to be receiving
gifts from the society in recognition as past pres-
idents of the contributions we had made to the
society. We received gavels with the names of
all of the first 20 presidents. I prepared a gift that
I gave to the society in return when I was given
my gavel. I gave them a banner which had the
ORSA logo on it and dates from 1952, when
the society was formed, to infinity on the other
side.
I did something like that later on for Omega
Rho when that society was established. I gave
a motto to Omega Rho. The motto was Ad Astra,
which is Latin for ‘‘to the stars.’’ I gave them this
flag I had drawn by hand on a bed sheet. Later,
they made it up in felt and they hung it for a few
years at the annual meetings. It was the official
flag of the society.
I mentioned to you earlier in this interview
that I had done some unpaid work for NATO, as
a volunteer representative from the US ORSA
activity to NATO. I viewed all of the activities
that we performed as constructive. We were
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there to help NATO do a good overall job, and
that included more than fighting wars. We
helped to set up and support the IFORS meet-
ings. There were other people outside NATO
who supported IFORS, and that included po-
tential enemies as well as friends. But in IFORS
we were essentially all working for the general
good of mankind, which made IFORS a won-
derful organization.
I continued for quite some time. I was one of
four people who had attended all the IFORS
meetings up through the ninth IFORS meeting.
IFORS were held every three years, which
meant I spent 27 years as an attendee and repre-
sentative of the United States at these meetings.
For a couple of years running, I was a Vice Pres-
ident of IFORS. I was the chairman of one of the
meetings and was the after-dinner speaker. I de-
cided that I would have some fun at this meet-
ing and give the people a history of IFORS in
terms of the kind of contributions that IFORS
had made, and with very specific reference to
what transpired at each different IFORS meeting.
These IFORS meetings occurred all over the
world: Japan, the United States, Mexico, Canada,
England, France, Spain, Greece, Italy, Israel, and
so on.
I gave a talk full of slides taken at various lo-
cations and the tourist things one could view,
and made comments ostensibly related to the
operations research aspects of the site. When I
showed slides of Oslo, where the third IFORS
meeting took place, you could observe the sod
houses there that used to be the farm houses
for people living in Norway. You could see the
grass growing on the roofs and I said, ‘‘Here
you see an early OR solution to optimal housing
for the climate and activities taking place in
Norway at the time these were developed,’’
and everybody laughed.
I covered each of the nine meetings that
I had attended. There were some pictures that
were taken up in New England, where we went
swimming on one of our off days, and people
like George Kimball were there. I took pictures
of them in their bathing suits. I later made
sketches of them in pen and ink at home, which
I passed around. I made comments referring,
without mentioning names, to the physical shape
of these individuals, so there were quite a few
people with pot bellies and a little bit knock-
kneed or bow-legged.
I have gone to a few other OR meetings. I
was at the big anniversary of INFORMS that
was held in California in 2002. I gave a talk
and I received an award as an INFORMS Fellow
when the award was first instituted. I delivered
a paper, the Lanchester paper you were talking
about, at that meeting, and that was my swan
song in the OR community. I’m still alive, but
I’ve withdrawn from politics on the one hand
and OR on the other.
Bob Sheldon: What advice would you give to
someone interested in OR?
Joe Engel: My advice would be the same as it
would be for specialized careers of any sort.
Find out what kind of knowledge and experi-
ence you ought to have before embarking upon
such a career. Get formal academic training to
prepare yourself and decide whether you are
prepared to undergo that kind of training.
The main thing is whether or not you think
you are interested in the kind of activity that
you are contemplating. There are all sorts of fac-
ets to OR. When I entered OR, I was unaware of
most of these considerations. The subject matter
of OEG was fascinating, mainly how should the
Navy do its work better and how do you find
out? You go and visit them and see how they
work and you travel all over the world in all
kinds of ships and aircraft.
I happened to pick a job that I was temper-
amentally well suited for, and it was a place that
had a high quality of performance associated
with it. I met top people from the very begin-
ning. I was given fascinating assignments and
had a chance to travel and to support my family
well, so it was an ideal job for me.
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